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 Oddballs—low-probability, attention-capturing expectancy violations—are judged as 
longer than non-oddballs, but are temporal intervals that contain oddballs judged as longer than 
those that do not? In 2 experiments, we tested competing model predictions using a novel and 
covert measure of subjective duration—musical imagery reproduction. Participants verbally 
estimated and reproduced with musical imagery repeated, coherent, or incoherent familiar or 
unfamiliar chord sequences (3.5 s, 7 s, or 12 s) that either did or did not contain dynamic 
auditory oddballs. Participants verbally estimated repeated chord sequences that contained 
oddballs as shorter than those that did not, but reproduced with musical imagery incoherent 
chord sequences that contained oddballs as longer than those that did not. These findings suggest 
that (a) intervals that contain attention-capturing, high-priority events are judged as shorter than 
those that do not when people are engaged in relatively temporal information processing, but as 
longer than those that do not when people are engaged in relatively nontemporal information 
processing, and (b) temporal and nontemporal information processing are interdependent. These 
results support the resource allocation model of short interval time estimation. We discuss 
implications for attention- and memory-based models, dynamic attending theory, and the 
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Psychological time is a puzzling concept. How can something as illusory and intangible 
as time play such a critical role in our lives? This question has mystified philosophers for ages. 
Relatively recent empirical discoveries suggest that psychological time is a cognitive 
construction based on perceived and remembered change (Bertotti & Easthope, 1978; Block, 
1990; Fraisse, 1963). Change can characterized by continuous or discrete, and sensory or 
organismic, events (Poynter, 1989). People can track continuous sensory events like planet orbits 
to measure time’s passage on the scale of years, or discrete sensory events like clock ticks, finger 
taps, and musical beats to measure time’s passage on the scale of seconds. We cannot perceive 
time, itself, but we can form representations of it.  
Information Processing 
Psychological time is as illusory as it is susceptible to distortion. Block (1990) articulated 
four overarching factors that work together to distort psychological time: (1) individual 
differences, (2) the type of time judgment being made about a temporal interval, (3) the content 
that fills that interval, and (4) the type of information processing in which people engage during 
that interval.  
Examples of individual differences include species, age, sex, cultural background, and 
personality. Examples of types of time judgments include order, succession, and duration. By 
“the content that fills an interval,” Block (1990) means everything that occurs during a given 
interval of time. This might include many types of events and processes. Some are internal—
thoughts, feelings, neurological activity—and some are external, like tastes, lights, smells, and 
other sensory stimulation. Furthermore, these events and processes can have characteristics that 
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vary in quantity, complexity, structure, and predictability—in how many there are, how complex 
they are, how they are organized, and the degree to which they confirm or violate expectations. 
The type of information processing in which people engage during an interval can, for 
instance, be relatively temporal or nontemporal. People engage in relatively temporal 
information processing when attending to temporal information, such as the ticks of a clock, or 
the rhythm of a song. On the other hand, people engage in relatively nontemporal information 
processing when attending to nontemporal information, such as the color of a clock, or the 
loudness of a song.  
Everyday stimuli include both temporal and nontemporal information. Speech, for 
example, is characterized by temporal information, such as the length of words and inter-onset 
intervals (IOI; the durations between event onsets), or the rhythmic stress beats of sentences 
(Allen, 1972). But speech is also characterized by nontemporal information, ranging from vocal 
timbre to pitch intervals (Boltz, 1999). Both temporal and nontemporal information affect the 
perception of speech stimuli (Grosjean, 1980).  
In music, the relationship between temporal and nontemporal information is underscored. 
Music consists of temporal information—rhythms change over time, and the orderings of notes 
change over time. Plenty of nontemporal information exists, as well, such as timbres, amplitudes, 
pitches, and pitch contours. The ways in which nontemporal information is temporally organized 
in music is vital. Temporal information plays a key role in the perception of nontemporal 
properties, despite the fact that these nontempora properties are, themselves, nontemporal 
(Rosen, 1992). 
Attending to temporal information can mean focusing on the rhythm of your favorite 
song, or simply tracking the passage of time (e.g., by counting seconds, foot taps, heart beats, or 
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exhalations). People engage in relatively temporal information processing when researchers 
explicitly draw people’s attention to the passage of time, or when researchers present people with 
stimulus sequences that are structured in predictable ways—predictable event structures are 
processed relatively efficiently and free attentional resources to monitor the passage of time.  
On the other hand, attending to relatively nontemporal information can mean focusing on 
the texture of your favorite shirt, or doing things that distract you from noticing the passage of 
time. People engage in relatively nontemporal information processing in time estimation 
experiments where researchers intentionally avoid stating duration, aiming to prevent people 
from noticing, attending to, or monitoring the passage of time. People also engage in 
nontemporal information processing when presented with stimuli featuring unpredictable event 
structures. Unpredictable event structures consume attentional resources and distract people from 
tracking, or even noticing, the passage of time.  
Boltz (1998) investigated the role of temporal and nontemporal information processing 
on subjective duration in the context of music. Boltz manipulated whether melodies were 
structurally coherent or incoherent—whether or not the temporal information (rhythms) and 
nontemporal information (pitches) of the melodies were compatible. She manipulated the degree 
to which people were engaged in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing by 
instructing them to either attend to the melodies’ pitch properties (nontemporal information), 
total durations (temporal information), or both; another group was given no attending 
instructions.  
Boltz (1998) found that incoherent melodies were judged as longer than coherent ones 
when people were engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing (pitch alone; no 
attending in experiment 2), but not when people were engaged in relatively temporal information 
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processing (duration alone; rhythm alone). Incoherent melodies were judged as shorter than 
coherent ones when people were attempting to engage in both temporal and nontemporal 
information processing. This finding was considered an interference effect, where increased in 
processing load shortened subjective duration; interference effects are robust in the time 
estimation literature (Brown, 1997), and emerge when attentional resources are taxed and mental 
workload is high (see Simchy-Gross & Margulis, 2014, 2015). Boltz’s findings highlight the 
complex relationship between musical event structure, information processing, and subjective 
duration. Incoherent event structures can both lengthen and shorten subjective duration, and it 
depends on whether people are engaged in relatively temporal or nontemporal information 
processing.  
Event Structure and Information Processing 
Music and expectation. Organisms possess great varieties of learned and unlearned 
expectations—music happens to thrive on their exploitation. Music constantly taunts and teases 
our sense of knowing what comes next, our involuntary physiological processes that prepare us 
for future events, our anticipatory responses to things that either confirm, violate, or delay 
predictions. Expectancy manipulations shape musical experiences—whether listening, 
imagining, or performing (see Huron, 2006; Huron & Margulis, 2010). 
Musical expectancies fall into two broad categories: schematic and veridical (Bharucha, 
1987, 1994; Justus & Bharucha, 2001). Schematic expectations are formed by experiencing 
patterns in the environment over extensive amounts of time, and they inform predictions about 
general things in broad categories. Schematic expectations always operate automatically, though 




 Veridical expectations, on the other hand, are formed by observing patterns in the 
environment over short periods of time, and they inform predictions about specific things in 
particular situations. Veridical expectations make unfamiliar music familiar after relatively few 
exposures. If you hear an unfamiliar song play 12 times on the radio over the course of an hour-
long road trip, for instance, that song—and the sequential orderings of its musical events—will 
be veridically familiar by the time you arrive at your destination. 
To illustrate further, consider this: A sequence of letters listed alphabetically is more 
schematically predictable than that of a sequence of letters listed randomly. The alphabetical list 
confirms expectations for which we have strong schemas, rooted in years of exposure and 
rehearsal. Similarly, for an American, the Y symbol is more schematically predictable than the ¥ 
symbol, because of longstanding exposure. 
Now, consider a situation where this American is presented with eight symbols in a row, 
followed by a ninth symbol. Following a sequence of eight ¥ symbols, a ninth ¥ symbol will be 
less schematically predictable, yet more veridically predictable, than a ninth Y symbol. 
Schematic expectations continue to favor the occurrence of the ordinary Y, but veridical 
expectations favor the repetition of the locally established ¥.  
Schematic and veridical expectations can, and often do, contradict one another. A good 
musical example of this comes from the deceptive cadence. Deceptive cadences violate 
schematic expectations, but can do so while simultaneously confirming veridical expectations. 
Deceptive cadences violate the schematic expectation that musical passages close on the tonic (a 
harmony built on the first scale degree). But this violation can occur while simultaneously 
confirming a well-learned veridical expectation that a particular passage closes on the 
submediant (a harmony built on the sixth scale degree).  
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Deceptive cadences violate schematic expectancies about harmonic phrase closure, 
regardless of veridical predictability. Hearing a song 12 times can make deceptive cadences 
veridically familiar, for instance, but those familiar deceptive cadences nevertheless remain 
schematically surprising. Even our favorite songs backed with years of repeated listenings 
continually surprise us. This type of persistent schematic surprise in the face of veridical 
familiarity keeps music from getting boring; repetition, in fact, has been shown to make music 
more engaging, more interesting, more enjoyable, and even more musical (Margulis, 2014; 
Margulis & Simchy-Gross, 2016). 
Chord sequences. A practical and effective way to manipulate musical expectations is to 
vary the event structure of chord sequences. Chord sequences can be ordered in relatively 
predictable or unpredictable ways. Predictable chord sequences facilitate temporal information 
processing, and unpredictable ones facilitate nontemporal information processing. Repeated 
chord sequences (a single chord presented multiple times), for instance, are predictable—their 
patterns are easy to abstract. We are accustomed to processing repeated stimuli in daily life—
most things usually stay the same (Kruijne & Meeter, 2015). Repeated chord sequences facilitate 
temporal information processing because they afford listeners plenty of attention to devote to 
temporal information and track the passage of time. Coherent chord sequences are also relatively 
predictable. Coherent chord sequences are ordered in ways that confirm well-learned musical 
expectations and follow the rules of standard tonal harmony. In contrast to both repeated and 
coherent chord sequences, incoherent chord sequences are relatively unpredictable. Incoherent 
chord sequences are ordered in ways that violate well-learned musical expectations. Incoherent 
chord sequences disobey the rules of standard tonal harmony. Incoherent chord sequences 
facilitate relatively nontemporal information processing. When presented with incoherent chord 
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sequences, people are too occupied trying to make sense of the musical twists, turns, and 
violations to devote any meaningful amount of attention to temporal information or the 
monitoring of time.  
Although both repeated and coherent sequences are relatively predictable, different 
processes underlie their perceptions (Huettel, Mack, & McCarthy, 2002). Repetition produces 
extraordinary perceptual and cognitive effects, enhancing encoding efficiency, predictive 
attending, and entrainment (Margulis, 2014). Repeated sequences are efficiently processed and 
easily stored in memory (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996). Repeated sequences facilitate 
stimulus identification (Bybee, 2002) and confirm low-level expectations (Dehaene et al., 2001). 
Repeated stimuli produce robust priming effects (Kristjánsson & Campana, 2010), decreasing 
task reaction times and errors (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994), saccade latencies (McPeek, 
Maljkovic, & Nakayama, 1999), and the amount of neural activity required for processing (Grill-
Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006; see also Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2012). 
Moreover, although both repeated and coherent stimuli facilitate relatively temporal 
information processing, repeated ones have been shown to do so more effectively than coherent 
ones. Cai, Eagleman, and Ma (2015) showed that repeated sequences have stronger subjective 
duration-distorting effects than coherent ones, suggesting that repeated stimuli are perceived 
more efficiently, capture fewer attentional resources, and facilitate temporal information 
processing more effectively than coherent stimuli. Repeated stimuli have also been shown to 
facilitate priming effects to a greater degree than similar, yet not identical, stimuli (Koutstaal et 
al., 2001). 
In contrast to repeated chord sequences, coherent ones recruit a great number and variety 
of musical expectations. Most of the music we hear in daily life is structurally coherent. It is rare 
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that we hear a song on the radio repeat the first musical event innumerably. Although repetition 
is a core musical element (Margulis, 2014), the kind of repetition that characterizes music is not 
generally the ceaseless repetition of a single event. Nonetheless, in the present research, we will 
refer to single repeating elements (e.g., I—I—I—I—I—I) as repeated chord sequences, and 
collections of different, yet organized, elements as coherent chord sequences (e.g., iii—vi—ii—
IV—V—viio—I).  
Different, yet organized, musical elements—those ordered in structurally coherent 
ways—are frequently encountered in everyday life. People of western society most often hear 
structurally coherent music, and thus form strong schemas that music, in general, should sound 
coherent. These schemas, or schematic expectations, govern our perceptions of music. The 
ability that music has to form, confirm, violate, and delay expectations is a big part of what 
makes music emotionally moving and engaging. How does music manage to pull us to the edge 
of our seats at a concert hall, or make us jump up and down at a festival? Music does this by 
diligently manipulating, teasing, twisting, and turning our sense of knowing what we are going to 
hear, and when we are going to hear it.  
Manipulations of musical expectations, furthermore, facilitate both temporal and 
nontemporal information processing. We expect musical chord sequences to both contain typical 
chords, such as dominants and tonics. This is an expectation about nontemporal information. We 
also expect the tonic to follow the dominant—an expectation about temporal information. 
Coherent chord sequences confirm both of these types of expectations—expectations about both 
temporal and nontemporal information. Coherent chord sequences include both the “usual 
suspects” and their “usual orderings.” Thus, coherent chord sequences, having both predictable 
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temporal and nontemporal elements, facilitate both temporal and nontemporal information 
processing.  
In sum, repeated chord sequences facilitate temporal information processing, and 
coherent chord sequences facilitate both temporal and nontemporal information processing. The 
distinction between the type of temporal information processing facilitated by repeated and 
coherent chord sequences is that coherent ones facilitate temporal information processing by 
focusing attention on temporal musical properties (e.g., rhythm), whereas repeated chord 
sequences facilitate temporal information processing by allowing attention to effectively track 
the passage of time (e.g., count seconds). It is easier to count seconds when presented with 
repeated events than when presented with non-repeated events because repeated events capture 
relatively few attentional resources and consume relatively little cognitive capacity (Boltz, 1995; 
Jones & Boltz 1989; Zakay, 1993; Zakay & Block, 1995).  
Music and Time 
Music is particularly well suited for the study of psychological time. There are many 
reasons for this, 10 of which are outlined here: (1) music is temporal, (2) music is an auditory 
stimulus, (3) music comprises pitches, (4) music comprises chords, (5) music is highly 
structured, (6) music lacks a semantics, (7) music manipulates expectations, (8) music affects 
emotions, (9) music distorts subjective time, and (10) music is pervasive in the literature. 
Music is temporal. Time is intrinsic to music. Music consists of events that change over 
time. Pitches go up and down. Harmonies modulate. Rhythms are temporal patterns established 
by the rate of these changes. In contrast to static art forms, such as paintings and sculptures, 
music changes over time—music is dynamic. Temporal relationships between chord sequences 
play a key role in the processing of musical harmony (Bigand, Madurell, Tillmann, & Pineau, 
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1999). The different ways in which music unfolds over time uniquely affect subjective 
experiences of time.  
Music is an auditory stimulus. The auditory modality has extremely high temporal 
resolution (Block, 1990). People have better temporal sensitivity in the auditory than in the 
visual modality (Shams & Kim, 2010; Ortega, Guzman-Martinez, Grabowecky, & Suzuki, 
2014), and are better at discriminating temporal intervals with the help of auditory cues than 
visual cues (Grondin & McAuley, 2009). Auditory information, moreover, has been shown to 
affect visual duration judgments, but not vice versa (Klink, Montijn, & van Wezel, 2011). 
Human perceptions of temporal phenomena are most often studied in the auditory domain 
(Penhune, Zatorre, & Evans, 1998).  
Music comprises pitches. Pitch stimuli have better temporal sensitivity than speech 
stimuli (Grondin, Bisson, & Gagnon, 2011). Pitches have their own memory store (Deutsch, 
1972), making memory for pitches resilient to speech masking (Deutsch, 1970). Pitch stimuli 
afford more experimental control than speech stimuli—speech is one of most complex auditory 
signals in the environment (Donnadieu, 2007). 
Pitch stimuli are often preferred to speech stimuli when conducting time estimation 
research (Field & Groeger, 2004; Ponsot, Susini, & Meunier, 2015; Sasaki et al., 2010). 
Sequences of pitches (melodies) are informative (see Boltz, 1989, 1991, 1992a, 1993, 1998; 
Boltz & Jones, 1986), and sequences of overlapping pitches (chord sequences) are especially 
informative (see Bigand & Parncutt, 1999; Bigand et al., 1999; Bigand, Poulin, Tillmann, 
Madurell, & D'Adamo, 2003; Bueno & Ramos, 2007; Droit-Volet, Bigand, Ramos, & Bueno, 
2010; Firmino & Bueno, 2008, 2013, 2014; Firmino, Bueno, & Bigand, 2009; Lebrun-Guillaud 
& Tillmann, 2007; Lebrun-Guillaud, Tillmann, & Justus, 2008; Regnault, Bigand, & Besson, 
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2001; Schmuckler & Boltz, 1994; Tillmann & Bigand, 2001; Tillmann, Bigand, & Pineau, 1998; 
Tillmann & Lebrun-Guillaud, 2006). 
Music comprises chords. When the empirical goal is to produce strong manipulations of 
expectation, chord sequences are often superior to pitch sequences. Chord sequences manipulate 
expectations about a greater number of musical events than pitches, expectations about 
harmonic—in addition to melodic—relationships between musical events, and expectations 
about the manner in which those harmonic musical events change within sequences. Whereas 
pitches manipulate expectations about individual tones, chord sequences manipulate expectations 
about groups of overlapping tones. Whereas pitches manipulate melodic expectations, chords 
manipulate both melodic and harmonic expectations. Whereas melodies confirm, violate, and 
delay predictions about the behavior of melodic intervals, chord sequences confirm, violate, and 
delay predictions about the behavior of both melodic and harmonic intervals, which triggers 
musical expectations that are involuntary and firmly engrained in the human cognitive system 
from extended exposure to western tonal music. Moreover, in contrast to melodies, chord 
sequences manipulate expectations about voice leading, or the ways in which individual pitches 
within each chord move between subsequent chords. 
Music is highly structured. Event structure is a key factor in time estimation research, 
and music has rich varieties of well-understood event structures. Very specific rules dictate the 
relationships between musical elements (Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1983). The high degree of 
structure in music makes it easy to manipulate structural coherence and shift temporal 
orientation. 
Music lacks a semantics. Musical syntactic processing involves the same brain areas as 
linguistic syntactic processing (Patel, 2003, 2007). Both language and music activate robust and 
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well-researched sets of expectations. Just as linguistic syntactical and grammatical rules are 
reinforced by linguistic expectancies, musical well-formedness rules are reinforced by musical 
expectancies. Just as people have strong expectations for how speech unfolds, people have strong 
expectancies for how music unfolds. Indeed, violations of musical well-formedness rules activate 
similar neural networks as violations of linguistic syntactical and grammatical rules (Maess, 
Koelsch, Gunter, & Friederici, 2001).  
That said, music and language are distinct in how they transmit meaning. Meaning in 
language depends on semantic comprehension; meaning in music, on the other hand, revolves 
around the manipulation of expectation. Language has semantic meaning; music has aesthetic 
meaning. In this way, music affords the opportunity to enhance experimental control. Since 
music lacks a clear semantics, it eliminates a potential complicating factor in stimuli design.  
Music manipulates expectations. Expectation is an undeniably important factor in time 
estimation research. Gaudreault and Fortin (2013), Thomaschke, Kiesel, and Hoffmann (2011), 
and Boltz (1998) have all shown that expectancy manipulations affect people's subjective 
experiences of time. Few mediums manipulate expectations more naturally and to a greater 
extent than music. 
Music affects emotions. Music impacts emotions (Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008; Meyer, 
1956) and emotions impact psychological time (Wittmann & Paulus, 2008). The manipulation of 
musical expectancies is one of the most central ways that music shapes emotional experiences. 
Musical surprise registers as tension, and as expectations develop and are thwarted and satisfied, 
dynamic patterns of perceived tension and resolution emerge.  
Music affects subjective time. Music is dynamic, and its progression shapes durational 
experiences. Music can shorten subjective duration, making time seem to have passed relatively 
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quickly—we often lose track of time while listening. Listening to our favorite tunes might make 
time seem to “fly by” by turning our focus away from the passage of time. Music can also 
lengthen subjective duration, making time seem to have passed relatively slowly. We sometimes 
find ourselves focusing on nothing but time when hearing undesirable music. Unwanted party 
music might make failed attempts to sleep seem to last forever. 
Music is pervasive in the literature. Researchers often use music to study psychological 
time (see Bailey & Areni, 2006; Barnes & Jones, 2000; Bigand et al., 1999; Bisson, Tobin, & 
Grondin, 2009; Boltz, 1989, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1998; Bueno, Firmino, & 
Engelmann, 2002; Chebat, Gelinas-Chebat, & Filiatrault, 1993; Jones, 1990; Jones, Boltz, & 
Kidd, 1982; Kellaris & Kent, 1992; Phillips & Cross, 2011; Ziv & Omer, 2010). Some models of 
time estimation, in fact, revolve almost entirely around music (see Jones & Boltz, 1989; Schafer, 
Fachner, & Smukalla, 2013; see also Caetano, Mouchtaris, & Wiering, 2012). This existing body 
of research makes it easy to frame new studies about music and psychological time. 
Time Estimation Method 
Verbal estimation. One of the most common methods to measure subjective duration is 
verbal estimation (Bisson, Tobin, & Grondin, 2009). Verbal estimates are explicit reports of 
subjective duration made using numeric labels (e.g., seconds). It is particularly appropriate to use 
the method of verbal estimation when measuring the subjective duration of relatively long 
intervals. Verbal estimates are practical because they help keep experiments to reasonable 
lengths—people can report numeric values relatively quickly. Using the method of verbal 
estimation can be troublesome, however, because verbal estimates rely on language. People 
making verbal estimations are burdened with the tricky task of translating subjective temporal 
experiences into objective temporal labels. 
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Duration reproduction. The method of duration reproduction does not rely on language. 
Duration reproductions involve remembering, imagining, and replicating previously experienced 
temporal intervals. Duration reproductions can be produced after participants experience a 
temporal interval by either (a) experimentally marking the beginning of a reproduction interval 
and instructing people to press a button after an identical amount of time as the experienced 
interval has passed, (b) instructing people to press a button to both start and stop a timer to 
demarcate a duration identical to the experienced interval, or (c) instructing people to hold down 
a button for a duration identical to the experienced interval. Most common is the version that 
requires people to both start and stop a timer, probably because it yields the most accurate 
estimates (Mioni, Stablum, McClintock, & Grondin, 2014).  
The method of duration reproduction is arguably the most reliable and sensitive measure 
of subjective duration (Fraisse, 1963; McKay, 1977). The method of duration reproduction is 
best suited for relatively short intervals—people tend to underestimate duration as the actual 
durations of intervals lengthen.1 That said, it is ideal to use more than one method of measuring 
subjective duration when conducting time estimation research (Brown, 1985). Researchers tend 
to use both verbal estimation and duration reproduction in the same experiment (Block, George, 
& Reed, 1980; Brown, 1985; Warm, Smith, & Caldwell, 1967). 
Musical imagery reproduction. Explicit short interval time estimation experiments use 
methods of measuring subjective duration such as verbal estimation and duration reproduction 
(Grondin, 2010). The instructions in these types of experiments, however, include the word 
“duration” or “time.”2 No short interval time estimation experiments have included instructions 
that do not state duration.3 
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In contrast to typical explicit short interval time estimation experiments, we used a novel 
type of reproduction to measure subjective duration that avoids stating duration or time in the 
experimental instructions. We instructed people to generate musical imagery, recorded the 
amount of time it took people to do so, and treated those emergent temporal intervals as 
measures of subjective duration.4 We term these emergent temporal intervals musical imagery 
reproductions. There is evidence to suggest that musical imagery reproductions can be treated as, 
and are sensible and accurate representations of, subjective duration.  
Halpern and Zatorre (1999), investigating the neurological correlates of musical imagery 
using melodies, instructed people to listen to musical clips, imagine them, and then press a 
button when the clips reached their original ending points. To confirm that the auditory images 
were conforming to the actual durations of the musical clips, they compared the differences 
between the latencies of the short, medium, and long trials. The amount of time that passed from 
the offsets of the musical clips to the final button presses matched the actual durations of the 
clips. These findings show that musical imaginings can yield relatively accurate measures of 
subjective duration, without requiring participants to undertake an explicitly temporal task—
without stating duration or time in the experimental instructions.  
Grondin and Killeen (2009), furthermore, instructed people to make duration 
reproductions while either singing familiar songs, counting seconds, or refraining from engaging 
in time-keeping behaviors. Duration reproductions created while singing were as accurate as 
those created while counting. These findings suggest that timing mechanisms involved in singing 
are similar to those involved in duration estimation. Moreover, Weber and Brown (1986) showed 
that it takes the same amount of time to imagine musical clips as it does to sing them. And 
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people tend to imagine songs at their original tempos (Levitin & Cook, 1996; see also Halpern, 
1988b). 
Musical imagery reproductions are similar to duration reproductions. Both require 
starting and stopping timers while mentally rehearsing information stored in memory, and both 
likely involve similar temporal representations (see Halpern, 1988a); even visual imagery has 
emergent temporal properties (Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser, 1978).5 The distinction between musical 
imagery reproductions and duration reproductions is that the instructions of duration 
reproductions explicitly state duration, whereas those of musical imagery reproductions do not.  
Duration reproductions involve retrieving from memory and rehearsing temporal 
information. Musical imagery reproductions, on the other hand, involve retrieving from memory 
and rehearsing musical information (Halpern & Zatorre, 1999). Musical information comprises 
both temporal and nontemporal properties.6 Hence, people imagine and rehearse more 
nontemporal information—and engage in more nontemporal information processing—when 
making musical imagery reproductions than when making duration reproductions. Musical 
imagery reproductions facilitate nontemporal information processing.  
People also engage in more nontemporal information processing when making musical 
imagery reproductions than when making verbal estimations. Verbal estimations only involve 
retrieving from memory and reporting temporal information—only involve attending to the 
passage of time and stating a numeric label. Verbal estimations facilitate temporal information 
processing.  
Time Estimation Paradigm 
Subjective duration can be measured in one of two paradigms: prospective or 
retrospective. In prospective paradigms, participants know that duration judgments will be asked 
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of them prior to the start of trials; in retrospective paradigms, participants do not. In retrospective 
paradigms, participants are asked to make duration judgments only after the experimental trial 
has ended. Prospective duration judgments illuminate how factors affect psychological time 
when people focus on the passage of time during the to-be-judged interval. Retrospective 
duration judgments, on the other hand, illuminate how factors affect psychological time when 
people focus on things unrelated to the passage of time during the to-be-judged interval.  
Some researchers have considered prospective judgments to be measures of experienced 
duration, and retrospective ones to be measures of remembered duration (Block, 1974, 1990; 
Zakay & Block, 2004). Yet because both types of duration judgments are collected following the 
experienced interval, and thus rely on memory (Rattat & Droit-Volet, 2010), it seems appropriate 
to consider prospective judgments as those that rely on remembered temporal information, and 
retrospective ones as those that rely on remembered nontemporal information. 
Prospective judgments tend to be more accurate, less variable, and longer than 
retrospective ones (cf. Grondin & Laflamme, 2015). Both prospective and retrospective 
judgments are likely driven by distinct cognitive (Zakay & Block, 2004) and neurological 
processes (Rao, Mayer, & Harrington, 2001), but might nevertheless involve similar timing 
mechanisms (Block, 1992; Brown & Stubbs, 1988). 
Researchers using the retrospective paradigm face methodological limitations: 
Retrospective duration judgments are often unclear, unreliable, and inconsistent (Block et al., 
1980; Hicks, Miller, & Kinsbourne, 1976; Zakay, 1989). Retrospective duration judgments are 
hard to interpret, and represent time estimation processes that are hard to manipulate. 




Researchers have devised elaborate measures to prevent people from suspecting the 
importance of the passage of time in retrospective experiments. Zakay (1993), for instance, 
refrained from asking people to remove their watches because this question might have shifted 
attention to the passage of time. Instead, Zakay required that people use their non-dominant 
hands to complete the experimental tactual tracing tasks, keeping the hand most likely to bear a 
watch under the table, and preventing them from glancing at it during the experiment.  
Only the first experimental trial can be retrospective—all trials thereafter are 
contaminated by the awareness of upcoming duration judgments. Some researchers have found 
ways around this limitation. For instance, Jones and Boltz (1989) had participants memorize all 
of the melody stimuli in the first experimental block, and then estimate the durations of all of the 
melodies in the second experimental block.  
Although there are ways to work around the limitations associated with the retrospective 
paradigm, there are more practical and less problematic ways for researchers who aim to 
facilitate nontemporal information processing to do so than using the retrospective paradigm. 
Researchers might find it useful to use musical imagery reproductions, for instance. Musical 
imagery reproductions both facilitate nontemporal information processing and, among other 
things, allow participants to complete multiple trials while staying ignorant to the true purpose of 
the experiment.  
Time Estimation Models 
Dynamic attending theory. Jones and Boltz (1989) emphasize that event structure plays 
an important role in psychological time. The extent to which temporal and nontemporal 
information are structurally compatible influences the degree to which people attend to relatively 
low-level stimulus characteristics (analytic attending) or high- level ones (future-oriented 
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attending). Moreover, incompatible (incoherent) event structures can disorient listeners, consume 
attentional resources, disrupt memory, and distort duration estimates. Confirmed, violated, and 
delayed expectations can make incoherent event structures that seem to end too early seem 
relatively short, and ones that seem to end too late seem relatively long. The importance of 
factors such as event structure, dynamic attending, and expectations in time estimation research 
cannot be overstated (Phillips, 2015).  
Attention-based models. Attention-based models of short interval time estimation argue 
that the riddle of subjective duration can be solved simply by considering whether people focus 
on time, or not. The more we focus on time, the longer time should seem to last; the less we 
focus on time, the shorter time should seem to last.  
Attention-based models emphasize that people have both a temporal processor and a 
nontemporal processor. These processors compete for limited attentional resources (Kahneman, 
1973). The more attentional resources allocated to the temporal processor, the longer duration 
estimates should become; the more attentional resources allocated to the nontemporal processor, 
the shorter duration estimates should become (Thomas & Brown, 1974; Thomas & Weaver, 
1975).  
The attentional gate model, for instance, theorizes that subjective temporal units, or 
pulses created by a pacemaker, pass through a cognitive “gate” and accumulate in a cognitive 
“counter” (Zakay & Block, 1995). The more attentional resources that are allocated to time 
during an interval, the wider the gate opens, the more pulses are counted, and the longer 
subjective duration estimates should become. 
Memory-based models. Memory-based models posit that subjective duration is a 
function of the amount of meaningful information stored in and retrieved from memory. The 
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storage size hypothesis, for example, theorizes that the greater the amount of information stored 
in memory, the longer duration estimates should become (Ornstein, 1969). Similarly, the 
contextual change (Block, 1978, 1982, 1989, 1990; Block & Reed, 1978) and change 
segmentation (Poynter, 1983, 1989; Poynter & Homa, 1983) hypotheses state that the greater the 
amount of contextual changes and high priority, or attention-capturing, events perceived and 
stored in memory, the longer duration estimates should become. The more meaningful chunks of 
information we remember in retrospect (Friedman, 1993), the longer things should seem to have 
lasted. 
Competing models. Attention- and memory-based models make different predictions 
about how various factors will affect subjective duration. One factor that these models make 
opposite predictions about is nontemporal information processing load, or nontemporal task 
difficulty. Nontemporal task difficulty, mental workload, or nontemporal information processing 
load refers to the amount of effort, cognitive resources, cognitive capacity, or information 
processing load required to complete a nontemporal task (Brown & Boltz, 2002; Proctor, Lu, 
Van Zandt, & Weeks, 1994). For example, the nontemporal task difficulty of the Color-Word 
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) is greater than that of the Word Stroop task (Logan, 1980; Logan & 
Zbrodoff, 1979). The simultaneous presentation of colors and words in the Color-Word Stroop 
task consumes relatively many attentional resources, thereby eliciting greater reaction times and 
numbers of errors (Dyer, 1973). 
Attention-based models predict that greater nontemporal task difficulty will shorten 
subjective duration. This is because greater nontemporal task difficulty should serve to distract 
attention from the passage of time, decreasing the number of accumulated subjective temporal 
units counted at the time of judgment, and thus shortening duration estimates. Memory-based 
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models, in contrast, predict that greater nontemporal task difficulty will lengthen subjective 
duration because greater nontemporal task difficulty should serve to increase the amount of high 
priority events perceived during the interval and remembered at the time of judgment, thus 
lengthening duration estimates.  
A unified model. The resource allocation model (RAM) asserts that the ways in which 
nontemporal task difficulty affects subjective duration are contingent upon the degree to which 
people are engaged in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing. Nontemporal 
task difficulty should shorten subjective duration when people are engaged in relatively temporal 
information processing, but lengthen subjective duration when people are engaged in relatively 
nontemporal information processing. 
According to the RAM, there exists a temporal processor, or an attentional timer 
(Berlyne, 1966), that stores and counts subjective temporal units (e.g., seconds), and a 
nontemporal processor, or a memory-based mechanism, that stores and counts high-priority 
events and contextual changes (e.g., textures). Both processors encode the contents of intervals. 
People can attend to the contents of intervals while engaging both processors. The amount of 
attentional resources allocated to each processor varies. The degree to which people engage a 
particular processor determines that processor’s contribution to the duration estimates. The more 
that people attend to and remember information encoded in a processor, the more that processor 
will contribute to duration estimates.  
Relatively high amounts of attentional resources are allocated to, and traces of 
information are retrievable from, the temporal processor when, for example, people judge 
duration prospectively, or when people are presented with homogeneous, or repeated, stimuli 
(Zakay, 1993). In contrast, relatively high amounts of attention are allocated to, and traces of 
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information are retrievable from, the nontemporal processor when people judge duration 
retrospectively, or when people are presented with unpredictable, or incoherent, stimuli (Jones & 
Boltz, 1989; Zakay & Block, 1995).  
The RAM was motivated by the observation that although attention- and memory-based 
models make contradictory predictions, both models are valid in certain contexts. Findings 
explained by attention-based models tend to emerge in conditions where people are aware of 
upcoming duration judgments, estimate duration immediately after intervals end, and base 
duration estimates on temporal information stored in short-term memory. These conditions 
facilitate temporal information processing. On the other hand, findings explained by memory-
based models tend to emerge in conditions where people are ignorant to upcoming duration 
judgments, estimate durations after delays when intervals end, and base duration estimates on 
nontemporal information stored in long-term memory.7 These conditions facilitate nontemporal 
information processing.  
Neither attention- nor memory-based models can solely account for all of the 
contradictory results found in time estimation studies testing the effects of time estimation 
paradigm, but together they can: Attention-based models tend to explain duration estimates in 
prospective paradigms; memory-based models tend to explain duration estimates in retrospective 
paradigms (Block & Zakay, 1997). Similar conclusions can be drawn in studies testing the 
effects of time estimation delay and time estimation reference (Zakay, 1989, 1993; Zakay & 
Fallach, 1984).8 
Evidence for the RAM. Miller, G. W., Hicks, and Willette (1978) showed that greater 
nontemporal task difficulty (fewer rehearsed trials) shortened subjective duration when people 
were engaged in relatively temporal information processing (rehearsal; prospective), but 
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lengthened subjective duration when people were engaged in relatively nontemporal information 
processing (rehearsal; retrospective).  
Block et al. (1980) varied whether or not a liquid beaker boiled and instructed 
participants to “observe the beaker.” Intervals that contained boiling liquid were judged as 
shorter than those that did not when people were engaged in relatively temporal information 
processing (reproductions; prospective), but as longer than those that did not when people were 
engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing (reproductions; retrospective).  
McClain (1983) manipulated nontemporal task difficulty by varying the length of word 
lists. She required that participants classify words based on either shallow, graphemic properties 
or deep, semantic ones. Greater nontemporal task difficulty (longer lists) shortened subjective 
duration when people were engaged in relatively temporal information processing (prospective; 
semantic- intentional; semantic- incidental), but lengthened subjective duration when people were 
engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing (retrospective). 
 Zakay and Fallach (1984) showed that greater nontemporal task difficulty (high-
difficulty Stroop task) shortened subjective duration when people were engaged in relatively 
temporal information processing (immediate estimation), but not when people were engaged in 
relatively nontemporal information processing (remote estimation).  
Zakay (1989) similarly showed that greater nontemporal task difficulty (CW Stroop task) 
shortened subjective duration when people were engaged in relatively temporal information 
processing (prospective-immediate estimation), but not when people were engaged in relatively 
nontemporal information processing (prospective-remote estimation).  
Zakay (1993), in addition, showed how factors that manipulate information processing 
can interact. Zakay found that greater nontemporal task difficulty (complex tactile shapes) 
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shortened subjective duration when people were engaged in relatively temporal information 
processing (absolute; prospective), but lengthened subjective duration when people were 
engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing (relative; retrospective).  
Zakay, Tsal, Moses, and Shahar (1994) varied the degree to which stimulus properties 
promoted interval segmentation—participants perceived auditory word and tactual letter lists as 
having greater or fewer numbers of “chunks.” Greater segmentation lengthened subjective 
duration when people were engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing 
(retrospective-absolute; retrospective-comparative), but did not affect subjective duration when 
people were engaged in relatively temporal information processing (prospective-absolute; 
prospective-comparative).9 
Zakay and Block (2004) manipulated nontemporal task difficulty in a variety of ways, 
showing how varying levels of syntactic ambiguity, Stroop task difficulty, and task switching 
can compound to increase difficulty.10 Greater nontemporal task difficulty shortened subjective 
duration when people were engaged in relatively temporal information processing (prospective), 
but lengthened subjective duration when people were engaged in relatively nontemporal 
information processing (retrospective).  
As a whole, these studies lend a good deal of evidence in support of the RAM. The RAM 
unifies the predictions of both the attention- and memory-based models of time estimation, 
maximizing its predictive power, accuracy, and specificity. The RAM provides a useful 
framework from which to make predictions about the effects of attention-capturing stimuli on 
psychological time.  
Temporal expansion hypothesis. In 2004, Tse, Intriligator, Rivest, and Cavanagh ran a 
series of experiments showing how oddballs are judged as longer than standards.11 The finding 
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that oddballs are judged as longer than standards is robust and reliable in the time perception 
literature, and is known as the temporal oddball effect, or the temporal oddball illusion 
(Birngruber, Schröter, & Ulrich, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a; Kim & McAuley, 2013; Pariyadath & 
Eagleman, 2007, 2012; Schindel, Rowlands, & Arnold, 2011; see also Birngruber, Schröter, & 
Ulrich, 2015b; Matthews, 2015; Matthews & Gheorghiu, 2016). 
Tse et al. (2004) proposed the temporal expansion hypothesis to explain why oddballs are 
judged as longer than standards: Oddballs expand, or lengthen, subjective duration because 
oddballs capture attention, increase the rate of information processing, and increase the number 
of subjective temporal units stored and counted in a cognitive timer. Tse et al. based this 
hypothesis on the tenets of attention-based models of short interval time estimation, such that 
attention-based models assert the existence of a counter mechanism that accumulates and tallies 
the number of subjective temporal units registered in a cognitive timer (Thomas & Weaver, 
1975; Treisman, 1963). Attention-capturing stimuli should shorten subjective duration because 
when stimuli capture attention, more attentional resources are directed to the nontemporal 
information of the stimuli, and fewer attentional resources are directed to time-keeping 
behaviors.  
Rationale for the Present Research  
Past research shows that oddballs are judged as longer than standards, but no research has 
tested whether or not this temporal oddball illusion applies to intervals, in addition to individual 
events. Are intervals that contain oddballs judged as longer than those that do not? The temporal 
expansion hypothesis predicts that people will judge intervals that contain oddballs as longer 
than those that do not. The RAM, on the other hand, predicts that people will judge intervals that 
contain oddballs as shorter than those that do not when people are engaged in relatively temporal 
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information processing, but as longer than those that do not when people are engaged in 
relatively nontemporal information processing. 
The temporal expansion hypothesis asserts that oddballs lengthen subjective duration 
because more subjective temporal units are stored and counted in the cognitive timer when 
perceiving oddballs than when perceiving standards. If this is true, then more subjective temporal 
units should be stored and counted in the cognitive timer when perceiving intervals that contain 
oddballs than when perceiving otherwise identical intervals that do not contain oddballs. 
Therefore, if the temporal expansion hypothesis is valid in the context of intervals, in addition to 
individual events, in addition to the context of individual event time perception, then we should 
find that intervals that contain oddballs are consistently judged as longer than those that do not.  
The RAM, in contrast, posits that the inclusion of oddballs in intervals should both 
distract attention from the passage of time when people are engaging in relatively temporal 
information processing and increase the number of high-priority events perceived and 
remembered when people are engaging in relatively nontemporal information processing. 
Therefore, if the RAM is valid, then we should find that intervals that contain oddballs are 
judged as shorter than those that do not when people are engaged in relatively temporal 
information processing, but as longer than those that do not when people are engaged in 
relatively nontemporal information processing.  
The present research tests these competing hypotheses. In two experiments, we 
manipulated whether or not musical chord sequences contained oddballs, and the degree to 




In experiment 1, we manipulated the degree to which people were engaged in relatively 
temporal or nontemporal information processing by (a) instructing participants to make either 
verbal estimations or musical imagery reproductions (response type), and (b) varying whether 
chord sequences were repeated, coherent, or incoherent (event structure). 
We were inspired to vary response type by other studies showing that varying the types 
of judgments people make is an effective way to manipulate the degree to which people engage 
in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing (Zakay, 1993; Zakay et al., 1994). 
Much of the previous research, however, has used the retrospective paradigm to facilitate 
nontemporal information processing. We used the novel and covert method of musical imagery 
reproduction to facilitate nontemporal information processing. Musical imagery reproductions 
allowed us to facilitate nontemporal information processing while avoiding some of the 
methodological issues associated with the retrospective paradigm.  
We chose to vary musical event structure because it is particularly well suited to 
manipulate the extent to which people engage in relatively temporal or nontemporal information 
processing (Boltz, 1992b, 1995, 1998, 1999; Brown & Boltz, 2002; Jones, 1990; Zakay, 1993), 
but is seldom used to do so. We used chord, rather than pitch, sequences to manipulate a greater 
number and variety of expectations (e.g., harmony and voice leading). Repeated chord sequences 
are highly predictable, consume relatively few attentional resources, and facilitate temporal 
information processing—people presented with repeated events are able to allocate most of their 
attentional resources to time-keeping. In contrast, incoherent chord sequences are unpredictable, 
consume relatively many attentional resources, and facilitate nontemporal information 
processing—expectancy violations consume attentional resources that would have otherwise 
been available to track time. Coherent chord sequences are relatively predictable, confirm 
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schematic and veridical musical expectancies, draw attention to both temporal and nontemporal 
musical properties, and facilitate both temporal and nontemporal information processing.  
Method 
Participants. A total of 56 undergraduate students enrolled in General Psychology at the 
University of Arkansas volunteered to participate in this experiment in exchange for course 
credit. We excluded from the analysis the data of 4 participants (2 reported abnormal hearing, 1 
experienced technical issues, and 1 disregarded instructions). The remaining 52 participants (31 
females) ranged from 18 to 39 years of age (M = 19.88; SD = 3.45). None were music majors, 
but 9 had received formal musical training for at least 1 year, ranging from 1 to 8 years (M = 
3.60; SD = 2.61). All of the participants gave informed consent before participating in this 
experiment. This experiment was approved by the University of Arkansas IRB. 
Stimuli. We composed novel chord sequences using Finale 2012 music notation 
software. We created original chord sequences to control for extraneous variables and prior 
familiarity, isolating the musical variables of interest and ruling out the possibility that 
participants have previously heard the music. The chord sequences were composed of 4-voice 
(SATB) piano chords (no rests or silences)—half contained oddballs, half did not. The oddball 
was a sliding tone (E2 to F#6; 82 Hz to 1480 Hz; following Tse et al., 2004) played with an 
Ocarina timbre.12 We normalized the amplitude of the chord sequences using Audacity (2.0.6).  
The first chord of all of the chord sequences was root position C Major. This chord 
played consecutively in the repeated chord sequences (see Figure 1). The coherent and 
incoherent chord sequences included chords taken from the scale of C Major (I, ii, iii, IV, V, vi, 
viio; i.e., C Major, D Minor, E Minor, F Major, G Major, A Minor, B Diminished). The 
distinction between the coherent and incoherent chord sequences was the order of the chords, not 
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the chords themselves. We ordered the chords in the coherent chord sequences in ways that 
conformed to the rules of standard tonal harmony, such as voice leading, harmonic change, and 
melodic resolution (see Figure 2). In contrast, we ordered the chords in the incoherent chord 
sequences in ways that violated those rules (see Figure 3).  
The incoherent chord sequences were merely scrambled versions of the coherent ones. 
Kowal (1987) made coherent musical tone sequences incoherent by reversing the order of the 
tones. Kowal violated veridical, in addition to schematic, musical expectancies—the tone 
sequences were taken from familiar traditional folk tunes. We aimed to control for prior 
exposure and familiarity in experiment 1. We scrambled the coherent chord sequences (e.g., iii—
vi—ii—IV—V—viio—I) to create corresponding incoherent versions (vi—V—ii—I—viio—
IV—iii) similar to how Pariyadath and Eagleman (2007) scrambled predictable number 
sequences (1—2—3—4—5) to create corresponding unpredictable versions (e.g., 1—4—3—5—
2).  
In the chord sequences that contained oddballs, an oddball occurred once after every two 
to six chords, and one of those oddballs always occurred on the final beat of the chord sequence. 
The chord sequences that contained oddballs were in all other regards identical to those that did 
not (see Figure 4).  
We varied whether the chord sequences were repeated, coherent, or incoherent (three 
levels), and whether or not they contained oddballs (two levels) independently. This created six 
possible oddball X event structure pairings. To broaden generalizability, we created 12 “base” 
chord progressions (each of which had six oddball X event structure pairing versions). This 
produced 72 unique chord sequences. We then created 12 variations (crossed in a between-
subjects Latin-square design) of each of the 72 unique chord sequences. These 12 variations 
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differed in oddball placement set, or the particular sequential positions where the oddballs 
occurred—we placed oddballs on different musical beats. All other factors were held constant. 
To create the 12 “base” chord progressions, we varied the actual duration, the tempo, and 
rhythm of the chord sequences independently. We used three different durations, two different 
tempi, and two different rhythms—this produced 12 duration X tempo X rhythm pairings. The 
three durations were 3.5 s, 7 s, and 12 s. The two tempi were 71 beats per minute (bpm; 850 ms 
IOI) and 86 bpm (700 ms IOI). For the two rhythms, where eighth notes occurred in rhythm I, 
triplets occurred in rhythm II, and vice versa; both rhythms were composed of quarter notes (one 
chord per beat), eighth notes (two chords per beat), and triplets (three chords per beat). The 12 
base chord progressions were identical in all other regards. We varied tempo and rhythm to 
discourage identical trial responses, and encourage thoughtful and active participation. We 
varied duration to help account for methodological inconsistencies in the literature. It is 
important to use a variety of durations in every time estimation experiment because researchers 
often find different results when studying stimuli of different durations (Brown, 1985). 
Moreover, we included durations both shorter and longer than 5 seconds to expand 
generalizability to durations that rely on relatively short- and long-term memory, and to 
durations within the perceptual present, or specious present (see Block, 1990; Clark, 1999; 
Fraisse, 1984; James, 1890).  
Each participant heard each of the 72 unique chord sequences twice, amounting to 622 
chords and 74 oddballs, over the course of the experiment. The overall probability, then, of an 
oddball occurring was 11 %, comparable to other influential investigations of the effects of 
oddballs on subjective duration (see Tse et al., 2004).  
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Procedure. The experiment took place in a quiet room in the Music Cognition Lab at the 
University of Arkansas. Participants were tested individually in a 4’ x 4’ WhisperRoom sound 
isolation enclosure (MDL 4848E/ENV). They sat facing a 22” Dell P2212H monitor while 
wearing Sennheisser HD 600 open-air, around-ear headphones, and made responses using the 
computer keyboard, mouse, and DirectIN Rotary Controller (PCB v2014). The auditory stimuli 
were presented binaurally at a comfortable listening level. The experiment was presented using 
DirectRT (Version 2014; Empirisoft Corporation, New York, NY) on a Dell OptiPlex 7010 
desktop computer running Windows 7. Participants signed the consent form and placed all of 
their belongings and potentially distracting materials (e.g., phones and watches) in the 
experimental waiting room before entering the booth. Participants progressed through the 
experiment at their own pace.  
The experiment consisted of two blocks. Each block consisted of three practice trials, 
followed by 72 randomly presented experimental trials. Each participant completed 144 
experimental trials over the course of the experiment. In each of the trials, participants pressed a 
button to start a chord sequence and, after its completion, made a response. This response was a 
musical imagery reproduction in the first block, and a verbal estimation in the second block.  
In the first block, immediately upon the closure of the chord sequence in each trial, 
participants were presented with the on-screen question: “What is the duration of this excerpt? In 
other words, how many seconds passed from the moment it started to the moment it finished?” 
Participants were encouraged to round to the 10th decimal place and be as specific and accurate 
as possible.  
In the second block, immediately upon the closure of the chord sequence in each trial, 
participants were presented with the on-screen instructions: “Imagine that excerpt playing back 
32 
 
in your head. Re-play it through your head the exact way you heard it play through the 
headphones—from start to finish. Actually imagine it sound in your head exactly as you heard it 
sound through the headphones. Press the green button to mark the start of the excerpt you're 
imagining. Press the red button to mark the finish of the excerpt you're imagining.”  
A brief demographic questionnaire concluded the experiment, which lasted about 50 min.  
Data Analysis. We analyzed these data using linear mixed modeling (LMM; see Baayen, 
2008; Quené & Van den Bergh, 2004; Finch, Bolin, & Kelley, 2014). The four within-subjects 
fixed-effects factors were oddball (yes or no), response type (verbal estimation or musical 
imagery reproduction), event structure (repeated, coherent, or incoherent), and actual duration 
(3.5 s, 7 s, or 12 s). The between-subjects fixed-effect was oddball placement variation (12 
levels). The covariate was formal musical training (had or had not received training for at least 1 
year; following Janata & Paroo, 2006). The random effects were subject (52 levels) and item 
(base chord progression; 12 levels). We obtained a standardized measure of subjective duration 
by dividing the raw verbal estimation and musical imagery reproduction responses (ms) by the 
actual durations of the chord sequences. Ratio scores represent directional bias; values above 1 
represent overestimations and values below 1 represent underestimations (see Hornstein & 
Rotter, 1969). The data consisted of 7488 normally distributed ratio scores, 31 of which were 
identified as outliers using the generalized extreme studentized deviate method, and excluded 
from the analysis (Rosner, 1983).  
We first ran the maximal model that included all of the factors and their interactions, and 
the random slopes of each of the factors within each of the subject and item crossed grouping 
variables. We included maximal random slopes of the fixed effects to account for random slope 
variance, and omitted the random slopes of the fixed effects in order of least random variance to 
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obtain model convergence (following Barr, 2013; Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). The 
final converged model included the random slopes of oddball and response type with the subject 
grouping variable, and the random slopes of event structure and response type with the item 
grouping variable. 
Pseudo-R2 was .353, indicating that the final model explained, or modeled, 35.3 % more 
variance than the base model (the base model included only the subject and item grouping 
variables; Snijders & Bosker, 1994). The intercorrelation coefficients for subjects and items were 
.295 and .06, respectively, displaying substantial clustering among subjects and mild clustering 
among items. 
We ran the analysis in R (R Core Team, 2015) with restricted maximum likelihood using 
the lmer function of the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). We obtained 
regression weights using the summary function of the lme4 package, F statistics and p values 
(Satterthwaithe approximation) using the anova function of the car and lmerTest packages (Fox 
& Weisberg, 2010), and normed means, standard deviations, and standard errors using the 
summarySEwithin function of the Rmisc package (Morey, 2008).  
Results and Discussion 
The temporal expansion hypothesis predicts that people will judge the chord sequences 
that contain oddballs as longer than those that do not, regardless of whether people are engaged 
in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing.  
In contrast, the RAM predicts that when people are engaged in relatively temporal 
information processing, they will judge the chord sequences that contain oddballs as shorter than 
those that do not, but when people are engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing, 
they will judge the chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer than those that do not.  
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Specifically, the RAM predicts that in the present experiment (a) people will verbally 
estimate the chord sequences that contain oddballs as shorter, but reproduce with musical 
imagery the chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer, than those that do not, and (b) 
people will judge the repeated chord sequences that contain oddballs as shorter, the incoherent 
chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer, and the coherent chord sequences that contain 
oddballs as neither shorter nor longer, than those that do not.  
Furthermore, the RAM predicts that the effects of response type and event structure will 
compound, such that (c) the finding that people verbally estimate the chord sequences that 
contain oddballs as shorter than those that do not will be more robust when those chord 
sequences are repeated than when they are coherent, which in turn will be more robust than when 
they are incoherent, and (d) the finding that people reproduce with musical imagery the chord 
sequences that contain oddballs as longer than those that do not will be more robust when those 
chord sequences are incoherent than when they are coherent, which in turn will be more robust 
than when they are repeated.  
As predicted by the RAM, we found an oddball X response type interaction, F(1, 7251.36) = 
37.41, p < .0001 (see Figure 5). People verbally estimated the chord sequences that contained 
oddballs (M = 0.932; SD = 0.238) as shorter than those that did not (M = 0.957; SD = 0.242), β = 
-.0245, t(161) = -3.99, SE = 0.0062, p = .0001, but reproduced with musical imagery the chord 
sequences that contained oddballs (M = 0.969; SD = 0.291) as longer than those that did not (M = 
0.943; SD = 0.276), β = .0254, t(161) = 4.12, SE = 0.0062, p < .0001. These results show how 
oddballs shorten the subjective duration of chord sequences when people are engaged in 
relatively temporal information processing (verbal estimations), but lengthen the subjective 
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duration of chord sequences when people are engaged in relatively nontemporal information 
processing (musical imagery reproductions).   
Also in line with the RAM, we found an omnibus oddball X event structure interaction, 
F(2, 7249.99) = 3.01, p = .049 (see Figure 6). This interaction was driven by the difference between 
the effects of oddballs on the repeated chord sequences and those on the incoherent chord 
sequences, β = -0.0103, t(7250) = -2.05, SE = .005, p = .040, and the difference between the effects 
of oddballs on the repeated chord sequences and those on the coherent chord sequences, β = -
0.0110, t(7250) = -2.20, SE = .005, p = .028. The effects of oddballs were more negatively related 
to the repeated chord sequences than they were to the incoherent and coherent ones. People 
appeared to judge the repeated chord sequences that contained oddballs as shorter than those that 
did not (this difference was not significant at p = .064). These results further show how the 
degree to which people are engaged in relatively temporal or nontemporal information 
processing can shape the subjective duration-distorting effects of attention-capturing stimuli.  
Although the oddball X response type X event structure interaction was not significant, 
the influence of event structure on the effects of oddballs appeared to emerge only when people 
were making musical imagery reproductions. The oddball X event structure interaction was 
significant when people were making musical imagery reproductions, but not when they were 
making verbal estimations. In the musical imagery reproduction condition, the effects of oddballs 
were more positively related to the incoherent chord sequences than they were to the repeated 
ones, β = .0381, t(7259) = 2.69, SE = .0142, p = .007, and more positively related to the coherent 
chord sequences than they were to the repeated ones, although this difference was not significant 
at p = .067 (see Figure 7). People reproduced with musical imagery both the incoherent chord 
sequences that contained oddballs (M = 0.961; SD = 0.225) as longer than those that did not (M = 
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0.932; SD = 0.216), β = .0421, t(1113) = 4.12, SE = .0102, p < .0001, and the coherent chord 
sequences that contained oddballs (M = 0.955; SD = 0.215) as longer than those that did not (M = 
0.941; SD = 0.210), β = .03, t(1107) = 2.93, SE = .0102, p = .003. These results offer some 
additional evidence to support the RAM, and offer the possibility that the influence of event 
structure on the effects of musical oddballs depend on musical imagery.  
We also found a main effect of event structure, F(2, 29.88) = 4.22, p = .024, and an event 
structure X response type interaction, F(1, 7250.08) = 9.80, p < .0001. People reproduced with 
musical imagery the repeated chord sequences (M = 0.977; SD = 0.274) as longer than both the 
coherent ones (M = 0.942; SD = 0.259), t(830) = 4.964, SE = .0071, p < .0001, and the incoherent 
ones (M = 0.949; SD = 0.273), t(850) = 3.681, SE = .0074, p < .001; these differences did not 
emerge when people were making verbal estimations. These results highlight the fact that the 
coherent and incoherent chord, but not the repeated, sequences that contained oddballs were 
reproduced with musical imagery as longer than those that did not. 
Finally, we found a main effect of duration, F(2, 9) = 19.51, p < .001, and a duration X 
response type interaction, F(2, 11.62) = 36.31, p < .0001. People verbally estimated the 3.5 s chord 
sequences (M = 0.995; SD = 0.243) as longer than both the 7 s ones (M = 0.936; SD = 0.212), β = 
.0605, t(9) = 3.138, SE = .0193, p = .012, and the 12 s ones (M = 0.903; SD = 0.216), β = .0927, 
t(9) = 4.81, SE = .0193, p < .001. On the other hand, people reproduced with musical imagery the 
12 s chord sequences (M = 0.849; SD = 0.231) as shorter than both the 3.5 s ones (M = 1.04; SD 
= 0.283), β = -.1308, t(9) = -4.74, SE = .0276, p = .001, and the 7 s ones (M = 0.979; SD = 0.248), 
β = -.1918, t(9) = -6.96, SE = .0276, p < .0001; people appeared to reproduced with musical 
imagery the 7 s chord sequences as shorter than the 3.5 s ones (this difference was not significant 
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at p = .054). These findings are in line with Vierordt’s law, and suggest that verbal estimations 
are more resistant to underestimations than musical imagery reproductions.  
No effects of oddball placement or formal musical training emerged. We found similar 
patterns of results when analyzing these data with the outliers included.   
Experiment 2 
The findings of experiment 1 lend considerable evidence in support of the RAM. The 
response type manipulation yeilded a robust interaction in the direction predicted by the RAM, 
and similar patterns of effects emerged when manipulating event structure. Event structure, 
however, appeared to influence the effects of oddballs in experiment 1 only when people were 
making musical imagery reproductions, and not when they were making verbal estimations. To 
further examine the influence of event structure on the subjective duration-distorting effects of 
oddballs in experiment 2, we included only musical imagery reproductions. 
In addition to varying event structure in experiment 2, we manipulated the degree to 
which people were engaged in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing by 
varying event familiarity; we included half of the chord sequences in an experimental exposure 
phase. Familiar events are veridically predictable, consume relatively few attentional resources, 
and facilitate early stages of information processing (Avant, Lyman, & Antes, 1975; see also 
Avant & Lyman, 1975). Stimuli that require relatively little cognitive capacity facilitate temporal 
information processing (Zakay, 1993). This is because reductions in nontemporal information 
processing load free attentional resources to process temporal information (Zakay & Block, 
1995)—psychological time is extraordinarily sensitive to manipulations of attention (Brown, 
2008). For the above reasons, Block, Hancock, and Zakay (2010) emphasized the importance 
that familiarity might have on duration judgments. In line with the RAM, Block et al. expected 
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that familiarity would have opposite subjective duration-distorting effects in prospective and 
retrospective conditions—conditions that facilitate temporal and nontemporal information 
processing, respectively (Zakay, 1989).  
 In experiment 2, we manipulated the degree to which people were engaged in relatively 
temporal or nontemporal information processing by varying (a) whether chord sequences were 
repeated, coherent, or incoherent (as in experiment 1), and (b) whether those chord sequences 
were familiar or unfamiliar.  
Method 
 Participants. A total of 57 undergraduate students enrolled in General Psychology at the 
University of Arkansas volunteered to participate in this experiment in exchange for course 
credit. We excluded from the analysis the data of 1 participant who reported abnormal hearing. 
The remaining 56 (38 females) participants ranged from 18 to 23 years of age (M = 19.66; SD = 
1.25). None were music majors, but 10 had received formal musical training for at least 1 year, 
ranging from 1 to 11 years (M = 3.35; SD = 3.27). None had participated in experiment 1. All of 
the participants gave informed consent before participating in this experiment. This experiment 
was approved by the University of Arkansas IRB. 
 Stimuli. We reused the stimuli from experiment 1, with some modifications: We 
shortened the actual durations of the 12 s and 7 s chord sequences to 8 s and 6 s, respectively—
and excluded the 3.5 s ones, altogether—to preserve the overall length of experiment 1. Whereas 
experiment 1 included 72 unique chord sequences, experiment 2 included only 48. We held all 
other factors identical to experiment 1.  
 Procedure. The first block of experiment 2 was an exposure phase. We randomly 
presented to participants a series of 288 chord sequences (24 unique chord sequences played 12 
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times each), and instructed participants to listen carefully to each one because important tasks 
would follow.13 
 In the second block, participants reproduced with musical imagery each of the 48 unique 
chord sequences (half of which were presented in the exposure phase and half of which were 
not). Immediately upon the closure of the chord sequence in each of the 48 trials, participants 
were presented with the on-screen instructions: “Imagine that same clip playing back in your 
head. Re-play it the same way you heard it, from beginning to end. Left-click to begin your 
imagined clip, then right-click when it ends.”  
All other aspects of the procedure were identical to those of experiment 1.  
Data Analysis. The four within-subjects fixed-effects factors were oddball (yes or no), 
event structure (repeated, coherent, or incoherent), event familiarity (familiar or unfamiliar), and 
actual duration (6 s or 8 s). The covariate was formal musical training (had or had not received 
training for at least 1 year). The random effects were subject (56 levels) and item (base chord 
progression; four levels). The data consisted of 2688 normally distributed ratio scores, 15 of 
which were identified as outliers using the generalized extreme studentized deviate method, and 
excluded from the analysis. The final converged model included the random slope of oddball 
with the subject grouping variable, and the random slopes of event structure and event familiarity 
with the item grouping variable. Pseudo-R2 was .495; the intercorrelation coefficients for 
subjects and items were .352 and .045, respectively.  
 All other aspects of the data analysis were identical to those of experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion 
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The temporal expansion hypothesis predicts that people will judge the chord sequences 
that contain oddballs as longer than those that do not, regardless of whether people are engaged 
in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing. 
The RAM predicts that when people are engaged in relatively temporal information 
processing, they will judge the chord sequences that contain oddballs as shorter than those that 
do not, but when people are engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing, they will 
judge the chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer than those that do not.  
Specifically, the RAM predicts that in the present experiment (a) people will reproduce 
with musical imagery the repeated chord sequences that contain oddballs as shorter, the 
incoherent chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer, and the coherent chord sequences 
that contain oddballs as neither shorter nor longer, than those that do not, and (b) people will 
reproduce with musical imagery the familiar chord sequences that contain oddballs as shorter, 
but the unfamiliar chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer, than those that do not.  
Moreover, the RAM predicts that the effects of event structure and event familiarity will 
compound, such that (c) the finding that people reproduce with musical imagery the repeated 
chord sequences that contain oddballs as shorter than those that do not will be more robust when 
those chord sequences are familiar than when they are unfamiliar, and (d) the finding that people 
reproduce with musical imagery the incoherent chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer 
than those that do not will be more robust when those chord sequences are unfamiliar than when 
they are familiar.  
As predicted by the RAM, we found an omnibus oddball X event structure interaction, 
F(2, 2535.68) = 8.02, p < .001 (see Figure 8). This interaction was driven by the difference between 
the effects of oddballs on the repeated chord sequences and those on the incoherent ones, β = 
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.0307, t(2535) = 3.66, SE = .0084, p < .001, and the difference between the effects of oddballs on 
the repeated chord sequences and those on the coherent ones, β = .0272, t(2536) = 3.245, SE = 
.0084, p = .001. People judged the repeated chord sequences that contained oddballs (M = 0.912; 
SD = 0.199) as shorter than those that did not (M = 0.946; SD = 0.192), t(349.3) = -2.72, SE = 
.0124, p = .007, but the incoherent chord sequences that contained oddballs (M = 0.901; SD = 
0.195) as longer than those that did not (M = 0.929; SD = 0.203), t(349.8) = 2.24, SE = .0124, p = 
.026; the difference between the subjective duration of the coherent chord sequences that 
contained oddballs and those that did not was not significant. These findings show how oddballs 
shorten the subjective of intervals when people are engaged in relatively temporal information 
processing (repeated chord sequences), but lengthen the subjective of intervals when people are 
engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing (incoherent chord sequences).  
Although the oddball X event structure X event familiarity interaction was not 
significant, people reproduced with musical imagery the repeated chord sequences that contained 
oddballs (M = 0.918; SD = 0.189) as shorter than those that did not (M = 0.957; SD = 0.175) 
when they were familiar, t(1018) = -2.301, SE = .0172, p = .022, but this difference was not 
significant when they were unfamiliar (see Figure 9). This result offers an additional piece of 
evidence to support the RAM, suggesting that familiar repeated sequences facilitate temporal 
information processing more effectively than unfamiliar ones.    
Similar to experiment 1, in line with Vierordt’s law, we found a main effect of duration, 
F(1, 2.06) = 35.53, p = .026. People judged the 8 s chord sequences (M = 0.881; SD = 0.248) as 
shorter than the 6 s ones (M = 0.965; SD = 0.252), β = -.0419, SE = .0071.  
No effect of formal musical training emerged. We found similar patterns of results when 





Empirical research has advanced our understanding of psychological time. Findings 
continue to be contradictory, however, and debates between major schools of thought are 
ongoing. The present research aimed to test the competing predictions of the temporal expansion 
hypothesis and the RAM. The temporal expansion hypothesis predicts that the inclusion of 
oddballs in intervals will lengthen subjective duration. But the RAM predicts that the inclusion 
of oddballs in intervals will both shorten and lengthen subjective duration, depending on the 
degree to which people are engaged in relatively temporal or nontemporal information 
processing. We varied whether intervals were composed of chord sequences did or did not 
contain oddballs, and manipulated the degree to which people were engaged in relatively 
temporal or nontemporal information processing by varying response type, event structure, and 
event familiarity.  
Experiment 1 revealed a robust oddball X response type interaction. In line with the 
predictions of the RAM, oddballs shortened subjective duration when people were making verbal 
estimations (relatively temporal information processing), but lengthened subjective duration 
when people were making musical imagery reproductions (relatively nontemporal information 
processing).  
Both experiment 1 and experiment 2 revealed significant oddball X event structure 
interactions. Again in line with the RAM, oddballs shortened subjective duration when people 
were presented with repeated chord sequences (relatively temporal information processing), but 
lengthened subjective duration when people were presented with incoherent chord sequences 
(relatively nontemporal information processing).  
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The oddball X event structure interaction in experiment 1 appeared to be specific to the 
musical imagery reproductions, and the oddball X event structure interaction found in 
experiment 2 (where people only made musical imagery reproductions) was more robust than 
that found in experiment 1. Hence, the influence of event structure on the effects of oddballs on 
the subjective duration of intervals seems to emerge primarily when people make musical 
imagery reproductions. This makes sense because musical event structure is more cognitively 
salient when people imagine music than when they do not (as was the case in the verbal 
estimation condition in experiment 1). This conclusion is of course tentative because the oddball 
X event structure X response type interaction in experiment 1 was not significant.  
We did not find an oddball X event familiarity interaction in experiment 2. Block et al. 
(2010) can explain this null finding. These researchers conducted a meta-analysis of over 100 
experiments and found that event familiarity did not affect time judgments in prospective 
experiments (such as the ones under current investigation). Block et al. reasoned that familiarity 
both frees attentional resources by facilitating information processing and consumes attentional 
resources by increasing memory search and the amount of retrievable associations. In this way, 
the contradictory influences of familiarity on the allocation of attentional resources effectively 
cancel each other out. This may also explain why other researchers have found weak or no 
effects of stimulus familiarity (see Schiffman & Bobko, 1977). 
An alternative explanation for why we found no effect of event familiarity is that event 
familiarity, as a factor, does not effectively manipulate the degree to which people are engaged 
in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing—that the confirmation of veridical 
expectations does not facilitate temporal information processing as effectively as the 
confirmation of schematic expectations (such as ones manipulated by varying event structure). It 
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is also possible that the particular way in which we manipulated event familiarity was not strong 
enough to produce any meaningful influence on the effects of oddballs.  
To preserve experimental control, we were limited to exposing people to excerpts during 
their laboratory session. We ran a preliminary study to determine that 12 randomly-ordered 
repetitions of each unique chord sequence was sufficient to make the chord sequences that had 
been included in an exposure phase significantly more familiar than ones that had not. However, 
the pilot study exposure phase included 144 chord sequences, whereas experiment 2 included 
288 chord sequences. It might be the case that 12 repetitions are enough to familiarize people 
with chord sequences when the exposure phase includes only 144 chord sequences, but not when 
the exposure phase includes 288 chord sequences. Also, the exposure phase in experiment 2 
lasted over 33 min—boredom and fatigue might have made it especially difficult to listen 
carefully to every chord sequence.  
It is also possible that experimental exposure phases, themselves, might not be able to 
make music familiar enough to influence information processing in any reliable ways. People 
become deeply familiar with favorite songs over hundreds of listenings over many years. 
Researchers studying the effects of preexposure, latent inhibition, and similarity on subjective 
duration have noted that multiple preexposures are required for significant subjective duration-
distorting effects to emerge (Zakay, 1989; see also Kowal, 1987). Future research might benefit 
from using preexisting music with which people are maximally familiar. 
The event structure X response type interaction in experiment 1 showed that the repeated 
chord sequences were reproduced with musical imagery, but not verbally estimated, as longer 
than both the coherent and incoherent ones. Brown and Boltz (2002) found similar results when 
varying mental workload and musical event structure. Both of their experiments were 
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prospective, hence participants were engaged in relatively temporal information processing. 
Although greater mental workload and incoherent event structure compounded to shorten 
subjective duration, the incoherent melodies were not judged as shorter than the coherent ones. 
The present research adds to these findings by showing how repeated, in addition to coherent and 
incoherent, musical sequences affect subjective duration. The repeated chord sequences in 
experiment 1 were reproduced with musical imagery as longer (more accurate) than both the 
coherent and incoherent ones.  
The reason that we did not find an event structure X response type interaction in 
experiment 2, as we did in experiment 1, appears to be that only in experiment 2 were the 
repeated chord sequences that contained oddballs reproduced with musical imagery as shorter 
than those that did not. Experiment 2 included a familiarity exposure phase that served to 
facilitate temporal information processing, whereas experiment 1 did not. Moreover, in 
experiment 2, only the difference between the familiar repeated chord sequences in experiment 2 
that contained oddballs and those that did not was significant. This latter finding lends the 
possibility that the repeated sequences and the familiarity exposure phase compounded to 
facilitate temporal information processing.  
Schiffman and Bobko (1977) similarly studied the potential compounding effects of 
repetition and familiarity, and alsofound no significant effects. These researchers presented 
participants color transparencies that contained either homogenous familiar, heterogeneous 
familiar, or heterogeneous unfamiliar stimuli. The homogenous familiar stimuli, analogous to the 
familiar repeated chord sequences in the present studies, were repeated household items (e.g., a 
series of eight identical apples); the heterogeneous familiar stimuli, comparable to the familiar 
incoherent chord sequences in the present studies, were assorted household items (e.g., table, 
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pencil, light bulb); the heterogeneous unfamiliar stimuli, comparable to the unfamiliar incoherent 
chord sequences in the present experiments, were assorted unrecognizable items. Participants 
prospectively reproduced the durations of the slides (5 s, 9 s, 13 s, 17 s). Schiffman and Bobko 
found no effects of familiarity, reasoning that their manipulation of familiarity might have not 
been effective. These findings further suggest that researchers must produce strong 
manipulations of familiarity to find subjective duration-distorting effects.  
In experiment 2, we found a main effect of duration, such that the 8 s chord sequences 
were more underestimated than the 6 s ones. We found a similar result in experiment 1, but the 
main effect of duration was characterized by a duration X response type interaction. The 12 s 
chord sequences were judged as longer than the 7 s ones when they were reproduced with 
musical imagery, but not when they were verbally estimated. This indicates that the tendency for 
underestimations to strengthen as actual duration lengthens (for relatively long durations) is more 
pronounced when people make musical imagery reproductions than when they make verbal 
estimations. This speaks to the accuracy of verbal estimations, and their resistance to an 
underestimation bias. People can more easily make verbal estimations about relatively long 
intervals than they can musical imagery reproductions. The energy required to make 
reproductions, in general, is a function of the actual duration of the to-be-judged interval. 
Whereas the amount of time it takes to make reproductions lengthens as the durations of the 
actual intervals lengthen, the amount of time it takes to make verbal estimations do not—it takes 
no longer to verbally report “22 s” than it does to report “2 s.” Overall, these effects of duration 
show how relatively long intervals are underestimated to a greater degree than relatively short 
ones, a finding both in line with Vierordt’s law and expected in time estimation research. 
Theoretical Implications   
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 Time estimation models. Both attention- and memory-based models make accurate 
predictions about subjective duration, but in different contexts. Attention-based models predict 
oddballs will shorten subjective duration. We found that oddballs shortened subjective duration 
when people made verbal estimations and were presented with repeated chord sequences, both of 
which facilitate temporal information processing. Memory-based models, on the other hand, 
predict oddballs will lengthen subjective duration. We found that oddballs lengthened subjective 
duration when people made musical imagery reproductions and were presented with incoherent 
chord sequences, both of which facilitate nontemporal information processing.  
 It is no coincidence that in the present experiments, the attention-based model predictions 
were accurate when people were engaged in relatively temporal information processing, whereas 
the memory-based model predictions were accurate when people were engaged in relatively 
nontemporal information processing—these patterns of results fit nicely with the tenets of the 
RAM. The present research manipulated event structure and response type independently. We 
found some evidence that they interacted to influence the effects of oddballs on subjective 
duration, but further research is needed to show how factors that manipulate the degree to which 
people engage in temporal and nontemporal information processing might interact. Discovering 
interactions of this sort would further support the proposition of the RAM and dynamic attending 
theory that temporal and nontemporal information processing are interdependent. 
 Dynamic attending theory. The collection of studies investigating the tenets of dynamic 
attending theory have manipulated temporal coherence by varying pitch sequences to show how 
event structure can directly influence subjective duration. We added uniquely to this effort. We 
manipulated harmonic coherence by varying chord sequences to show event structure can 
indirectly influence subjective duration. Our findings contribute to the literature surrounding 
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dynamic attending theory by suggesting that (a) variations in the structural characteristics of 
chord, in addition to pitch, sequences can affect subjective duration, (b) event structure can have 
indirect, in addition to direct, effects on subjective duration, and (c) the manipulation of 
temporal, but not harmonic, accents might be needed in order to find direct effects of coherent 
versus incoherent event structure on subjective duration.  
 We found an indirect effect of event structure on subjective duration, such that the effects 
of oddballs on the subjective duration of intervals were contingent upon the event structure of the 
chord sequences filling those intervals. We did not find a direct effect of event structure on 
subjective duration between the coherent and incoherent sequences—there were no differences 
between the subjective duration of the coherent and incoherent chord sequences—suggesting that 
the manipulation of temporal accents has a more robust effect on subjective duration than the 
manipulation of harmonic ones. Temporal accents have been manipulated by varying the 
durations of individual pitches in melodies—such that pitches range from dotted half notes to 
eighth notes (see Boltz, 1991, 1998; Jones & Boltz, 1989). A temporal accent is created when a 
musical event has a relatively long duration. In our experiments, the chord sequences did not 
have temporal accents because each musical event had the same duration.  
Dynamic attending theory emphasizes the role that event structure plays in time 
estimation, and the role that attending level plays in information processing. Analytic attending 
involves focusing on relatively low-level properties of stimuli. Examples of analytic attending 
include focusing on each individual event in a sequence as they occur and focusing on the timbre 
of someone’s voice as they speak. Future-oriented attending, in contrast, involves focusing on 
relatively high- level structural relationships between temporal and nontemporal properties of 
events. Future-oriented attending takes place, for example, when people both listen to someone 
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talk and anticipate when they will finish talking, as is done in order to make an appropriately 
timed response. Future-oriented attending also occurs when we both listen to musical sounds and 
anticipate the close of musical phrases, such as anticipating the occurrence of tonics following 
dominants. Future-oriented attending is tightly linked with expectation. We engage in future-
oriented attending when we can make predictions about both what events will occur and when 
they will occur. Coherent event structures facilitate future-oriented attending. Incoherent event 
structures facilitate analytic attending—people cannot engage in future-oriented, or expectation-
informed, attending if there exists no coherent structure from which to form expectations about. 
 Jones and Boltz (1989) would argue that people were engaged in future-oriented 
attending during the presentation of the coherent chord sequences in the present experiments. 
When coherent sequences contained oddballs, the oddballs violated the expectations activated by 
future-oriented attending. Thus, oddballs in coherent chord sequences not only violated 
expectations about event probability—oddballs are salient, attention-capturing, low-probability 
expectancy violations—but also schematic and veridical expectations about musical structure. 
The oddballs in the coherent sequences created temporal contrasts. A temporal contrast is created 
when an actual outcome is different from an expected outcome. In the coherent chord sequences 
that contained oddballs, expected outcomes about the structure of the music were violated when 
the oddballs occurred. 
 In the incoherent chord sequences in the current studies, people were engaged in analytic 
attending. Here, the oddballs only violated expectations about probability—there existed no 
future-oriented expectations to violate. The temporal contrasts created by oddballs in the 
incoherent chord sequences were theoretically weaker than those created by oddballs in the 
coherent chord sequences. If oddballs constituted weaker expectancy violations in the incoherent 
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compared to coherent chord sequences, then we should have found that the inclusion of oddballs 
in the chord sequences had a relatively robust effect on the coherent chord sequences. We found 
effects to the contrary: the incoherent chord sequences that contained oddballs were judged as 
longer than those that did not more often than the coherent chord sequences that contained 
oddballs were judged as longer than those that did not.  
 Dynamic attending theory can nonetheless account for this pattern of results by 
highlighting the role of perceptual grouping, or chunking: The incoherent chord sequences were 
affected by oddballs to a greater degree than the coherent ones because the incoherent ones 
facilitated perceptual chunking more than the coherent ones. People used analytic attending (e.g., 
chunking each chord as an event) when listening to the incoherent chord sequences, but used 
future-oriented attending (e.g., chunking each musical phrase as an event) when listening to the 
coherent ones. In this way, people might have imagined the incoherent chord sequences as 
having relatively many chunks, thereby producing relatively long musical imagery 
reproductions. 
 Another possible reason why oddballs had a greater effect on the incoherent, compared to 
coherent, chord sequences is that attending level shifted in the coherent ones, but did not shift in 
the incoherent ones. In the coherent chord sequences, oddballs shifted the level of attending from 
future-oriented to analytic, and thus violated any future-oriented musical expectations that may 
have formed leading up to the occurrence of the first oddball. In the incoherent chord sequences, 
on the other hand, oddballs did not shift the level of attending—attending was analytic both 
before and after the occurrence of the first oddball.  
Attending level shifts can affect memory, and musical imagery reproductions involve 
retrieving and rehearsing information from memory. If people listened to the coherent chord 
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sequences that did not contain oddballs with future-oriented attending, then they likely 
remembered and imagined them with that same future-oriented attending. But when these 
coherent chord sequences contained oddballs, future-oriented attending was disrupted and shifted 
to analytic attending. Accordingly, imaginings of those sequences were likely disrupted and 
fragmented, producing relatively short and inaccurate musical imagery reproductions. In 
contrast, if people listened to both the incoherent chord sequences that contained oddballs and 
those that did not with only analytic attending, then they likely remembered and imagined both 
with analytic attending. In this way, memory for the incoherent chord sequences that contained 
oddballs was not as disrupted and fragmented as memory for the coherent ones, thus producing 
relatively long and accurate musical imagery reproductions. 
Dynamic attending theory can also provide an explanation for the present finding that the 
coherent and incoherent chord sequences that contained oddballs were judged as longer than 
those that did not. Jones and Boltz (1989) showed that musical melodies that were 
experimentally manipulated to seem to end later than expected—by changing the event structure 
of pitch sequences—were duration reproduced as longer than melodies that were manipulated to 
seem to end on time. Likewise, they showed that melodies that seemed to end too soon were 
duration reproduced as shorter than those that seemed to end on time. If, in the present research, 
the inclusion of oddballs made the chord sequences seem to end too late, then this might explain 
why the chord sequences that contained oddballs were reproduced with musical imagery as 
longer than those that did not.  
There are a number of reasons why the inclusion oddballs in the present experiments 
might have made the chord sequences seem to end too late. People might have formed the 
veridical expectation that the chord sequences will end after the occurrence of the first oddball—
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the final event of all of the chord sequences that contained oddballs was always an oddball, not a 
chord. The 3.5 s chord sequences contained only one oddball, which closed the sequence. The 7 s 
and 12 s chord sequences, in contrast, contained multiple oddballs. Where people might have 
expected the the 7 s and 12 s sequences to end upon the occurrence of the first oddball, the 
sequences continued to play chords, perhaps seeming to play for too long, or seeming to end too 
late.  
Future research might explore this possibility by including only one oddball in all of the 
chord sequences, or by varying whether or not the final event of the chord sequences is an 
oddball or a chord. If people do veridically expect oddballs to close sequences, then sequences 
that end with chords—regardless of whether or not they contain oddballs—should be reproduced 
as shorter than those that end with oddballs. Of course, sequences can be made to seem to end 
too early by manipulating event structure, itself. For example, ending sequences on dominant, 
rather than tonic, chords should leave the schematic expectation that tonics close musical phrases 
unfulfilled, and thus make sequences seem to end too early and be judged as relatively short.  
Dynamic attending theory and repeated sequences. The present research offers the 
unique opportunity to discuss the tenets of dynamic attending theory in the novel context of 
repeated sequences, and the role of expectations for repeated events, in general. The repeated 
chord sequences in the present research were all the same—they all consisted of a repeated C 
Major chord. Do repeated sequences such as these facilitate analytic or future-oriented 
attending? To answer this question, let us consider how repeated sequences might affect musical 
expectations. Do repeated sequences confirm or violate musical expectations? Do they 
differentially manipulate schematic and veridical expectancies?  
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On the one hand, the repeated sequences in the present research violated the schematic 
expectation that, in general, music will progress. People enculturated to music in western society 
schematically expect music to change over time—people rarely hear single musical events 
repeated on end. On the other hand, the repeated sequences in the present research confirmed the 
veridical expectation that the repeated sequences in this particular experiment will repeat. People 
presented with the repeated sequences heard a C Major chord followed by the same C Major 
chord, again and again. Each subsequent C Major chord confirmed the veridical expectation that 
the next chord in the sequence would be the same as the one before it. Repeated sequences in the 
current research thus manipulated schematic and veridical expectations in opposite ways. The 
repeated sequences violated deeply-engrained schematic expectations about western tonal music, 
in general, while confirming locally-created veridical expectations about the particular chord 
sequences in these experiments. The repeated sequences allowed people to anticipate that each 
subsequent chord in the sequence would be the same: C Major. Furthermore, the chords had an 
isochronous periodicity—each had the same duration—and people tend to impose subjective 
accent structures on isochronous sequences (Boltz, 1992, 1994; Fraisse, 1956; Povel, 1981). 
People in the present studies were able to predict when each subsequent chord would occur. In 
this way, the repeated sequences offered both high nontemporal predictability about occurrence 
of the C Major chord, and high temporal predictability about occurrence of that chord at a 
regular beat period. 
To engage in future-oriented attending, people must be able to predict (a) what events 
will occur, (b) when they will occur, and (c) when the event sequence will end. The present 
repeated sequences, although offering high temporal predictability about the “what” and the 
“when” of each subsequent event, did not offer the ability to predict ending time.14 Because the 
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ability to predict ending time is a necessary condition for future-oriented attending, as described 
by Jones and Boltz (1989), the repeated chord sequences in the present research should have 
facilitated analytic attending. 
This conclusion is in line with the tenets of dynamic attending theory, attention-based 
models of time estimation, and the RAM, and fits with the findings of the current experiments. 
Dynamic attending theory posits that future-oriented attending requires being able to anticipate 
ending times of sequences. Since people in the present research were not able to do so with the 
repeated sequences, they instead were engaged in analytic attending. When people engage in 
analytic attending, they focus, among other things, on “counting” each subsequent event. 
Attention-based models, as well as the RAM, assert that people engaging in counting 
mechanisms in prospective paradigms (as was the paradigm of the present research) are engaging 
in temporal information processing; for example, people might treat each counted event as a 
subjective duration temporal unit, or a second. When people are engaged in temporal information 
processing, furthermore, attention-capturing events should shorten subjective duration. This is 
what we found in experiment 2. Attention-capturing events in the present research—oddballs—
shortened the subjective duration of the repeated chord sequences.  
It is possible that the absence, not presence, of oddballs lengthened the subjective 
duration of the repeated chord sequences in the present studies. The repeated chord sequences 
that did not contain oddballs may have seemed to last too long because they violated the 
schematic expectation that music, in general, will progress. Unfulfilled expectations about 
harmonic change—that the C Major chord will change to a different chord—might have made 
the sequences seem to last longer than they should have, or end too late. Also, this sort of 
delayed gratification—and ultimately unfulfilled expectation—for harmonic change might have 
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enhanced feelings of frustration, which itself can directly lengthen subjective duration (D. T. 
Miller, 1978).  
It is also possible that people were more bored when present with the repeated chord 
sequences that did not contain oddballs than people were when presented wit those that did 
contain oddballs. Boredom can emerge when nontemporal information processing load is 
relatively low (Zakay, 2014). Boring activities or circumstances increase desires to withdraw, 
and awareness to the passage of time (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Boredom lengthens subjective 
duration—boring experiences seem to last longer than engaging ones. It is possible that the 
repeated chord sequences that did not contain oddballs in the present research enhanced feelings 
of boredom—repeated sequences are processed relatively efficiently and consume relatively few 
attentional resources. Boredom, then, could have directly lengthened the repeated sequences by 
increasing desires to withdraw from the task, or indirectly lengthened subjective duration by 
making the repeated sequences seem to go on for too long, or end too late.  
Dynamic attending theory and the RAM. It is important to discuss the relationship 
between temporal and nontemporal information, temporal and nontemporal information 
processing, and structural coherence. Jones and Boltz (1989) assert that the degree to which 
temporal information is compatible with nontemporal information is a critical factor in time 
estimation, yet is often overlooked. Much of the existing time estimation research investigates 
how nontemporal information influences subjective duration. Researchers should also consider 
the role of temporal information. Nontemporal information can be organized in time in different 
ways, and the degree to which these organizations are coherent can influence subjective duration. 
When do nontemporal events occur in time? How are nontemporal events ordered in time? What 
are the durations of each nontemporal event, and how does each of their durations correspond 
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with their positions in event sequences? All of these questions concern temporal properties of 
nontemporal stimuli in our environment. These temporal properties are important to consider, 
control for, and examine in time estimation research.   
When nontemporal events have compatible temporal properties, people no longer 
perceive them as nontemporal events in isolation, but as nontemporal events informed by their 
temporal properties. When people order words in ways that form coherent sentences, we no 
longer perceive word sequences as groups of individual nontemporal verbal events, but rather as 
coherent utterances intended to communicate semantic meaning. When chords are ordered in 
ways that follow the rules of western tonal harmony, we no longer perceive them as individual 
nontemporal chordal events, but rather as coherent musical phrases. Future-oriented attending 
allows us to make sense of our environment by perceiving structurally coherent stimuli as 
nontemporal stimuli informed by their corresponding temporal properties. Dynamic attending 
theory asserts that temporal and nontemporal information are tightly linked—that people engage 
in an interdependent level of both temporal and nontemporal information processing—in 
coherent environments. 
We argue that the RAM is compatible with dynamic attending theory. The RAM treats 
the distinction between temporal and nontemporal information processing as merely relative, and 
acknowledges that both the temporal and nontemporal processors are activated when perceiving 
coherent stimuli. As Zakay stated:  
The weight assigned to specific information derived from either P(t) [the temporal 
processor] or P(m) [the nontemporal processor] is a function of the degree of 
attentiveness of the processor. . . . Temporal information processing takes place at all 
times, but it is done intermittently when cognitive capacity is not directly focused at P(t); 





The RAM defines engaging in temporal information processing as attending to high 
amounts of temporal information, relative to nontemporal information—certain amounts of 
nontemporal information are still perceived and processed. The same is true for the way in which 
the RAM defines engaging in nontemporal information processing, or when people attend to 
relatively high amounts of nontemporal information, relative to temporal information.  
The types of temporal information processing outlined by the RAM and that outlined by 
dynamic attending theory are similar in that both involve attending to temporal information, but 
both differ in important ways: The RAM refers to temporal information processing as that which 
occurs when people track duration by counting changes, such as seconds. This is usually the case 
in prospective paradigms, when people track the passage of time in preparation for upcoming 
duration judgments. Dynamic attending theory, on the other hand, refers to temporal information 
processing as that which occurs when people attend to temporal information, in general, not 
necessarily for the sake of tracking the passage of time—such as when focusing on the rhythm of 
a coherent musical song for the sake of listening to music.  
Counting seconds and attending to musical rhythm are not mutually exclusive behaviors, 
and both involve attending to temporal information, but they are unique in important ways. Each 
seem to occur under different circumstances. People often focus on the passage of time when 
asked to judge duration in time estimation experiments, or when engaged in boring, frustrating, 
or undesirable activities. People often attend to musical rhythm, on the other hand, when 
listening to, imagining, or performing coherent music. Moreover, focusing on the rhythm of a 
coherent song facilitates more nontemporal information processing than counting seconds 
because nontemporal musical properties, such as pitches, timbres, and contour changes, are 
tightly linked with temporal musical properties (Jones & Boltz, 1989). 
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In line with the RAM and dynamic attending theory, we treated the distinction between 
temporal and nontemporal information processing in the present research as relative. Participants 
were engaged in relatively temporal information processing when making verbal estimations, 
and in relatively nontemporal information processing when making musical imagery 
reproductions. Participants were engaged in relatively temporal information processing when 
listening to repeated chord sequences, and in relatively nontemporal information processing 
when listening to coherent and incoherent chord sequences. We found that chord sequences that 
contained oddballs were judged as shorter than those that did not when people were engaged in 
relatively temporal information processing, and judged as longer than those that did not when 
people were engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing. The present research is 
in line with both the RAM and dynamic attending theory, suggesting that temporal and 
nontemporal information processing are interdependent. 
Subjective temporal and nontemporal units. The present investigation found consistent 
support for the RAM. Nevertheless, when considered in isolation, some of the present findings 
can be considered as support for the temporal expansion hypothesis. The temporal expansion 
hypothesis predicts that people will judge chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer than 
those that did not, and this is what we found when people were engaged in relatively 
nontemporal information processing. This finding lends the possibility that the temporal oddball 
illusion is driven by nontemporal, rather than temporal, information processing. Oddball events 
might be judged as longer than standard events because oddballs increase attention to the 
oddballs’ nontemporal, rather than temporal, properties.  
This possibility is compatible with the temporal expansion hypothesis. Tse et al. (2004) 
theorize that oddballs are judged as longer than standards for the following reasons: An oddball 
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captures attention and increases the amount of attentional resources allocated to that oddball, 
relative to a standard. This enhancement of attention to the oddball increases the rate at which 
information is processed while perceiving the oddball. Because the rate of information 
processing increases, the number of “subjective temporal units” stored and counted by a 
cognitive timer increases. A higher number of units stored and counted during the perception of 
an oddball than during the perception of a standard makes the oddball seem longer than the 
standard, or expands the subjective duration of the oddball.  
Tse et al. (2004) base the mechanisms driving the temporal oddball illusion on the tenets 
of attention-based models of short interval time estimation, ones that assert the existence of a 
counter mechanism that accumulates and tallies the number of subjective temporal units stored in 
an accumulator (Thomas & Weaver, 1975; Treisman, 1963). These attention-based models 
predict that attention-capturing stimuli will shorten subjective duration, because when stimuli 
capture attention, more attention is focused on the nontemporal aspects of the stimuli and less 
attention is focused on the passage of time. When attention is distracted from the passage of 
time, the accumulation of subjective temporal units are missed, and fewer units are stored and 
counted. 
Tse et al. (2004) suggest that attention-capturing stimuli can, at the same time as they 
shorten subjective duration by distracting attention from the passage of time, lengthen subjective 
duration by increasing the “rate of information processing” of an individual event. When an 
event captures more attention, it increases the amount of information about that event that is 
processed. This increases the amount of “subjective temporal units” stored and counted, and thus 
lengthens the subjective duration of that event. Crucially, Tse et al. liken these subjective 
temporal units to those articulated by the attention-based models of time estimation, arguing that 
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attention-capturing stimuli (a) decrease the amount of subjective temporal units stored and 
counted by decreasing the amount of attention allocated to the passage of time, and also (b) 
increase the amount of subjective temporal units stored and counted by increasing the amount of 
attention allocated to individual nontemporal stimulus events. This proposition might, of course, 
be contradictory. How can the types of subjective units accumulated in these two scenarios be 
the same?  
To resolve the contradiction stated above, we merged the methodologies of the short 
interval time estimation and timing literatures and provide evidence to support the proposition 
that these two scenarios involve the accumulation of essentially different types of information: 
The former scenario involves the accumulation of subjective temporal units; the latter, subjective 
nontemporal information. More subjective temporal units are stored and counted when attending 
to the passage of time by counting seconds and tracking the passage of time. More subjective 
temporal units are units inferred directly from attending to the passage of time. More subjective 
nontemporal information, on the other hand, is stored in memory when increasing the rate of 
information processing of a nontemporal stimulus event; increasing the intensity or loudness of 
an event, the emotional salience of an event, the level of arousal elicited by an event, or the 
salience of an expectancy violation, such as an oddball, might increase the rate of information 
processing and thus nontemporal information stored in memory.  
When people are required to make duration judgments retrospectively, or duration 
judgments about individual subsecond events, subjective nontemporal information is inferred 
based on the amount of time-unrelated information perceived and remembered. This is because 
when people are engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing, they accumulate 
relatively few subjective temporal units from which to base duration judgments. People must 
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thus resort to making inferences about time’s passage based on the available memory traces of 
nontemporal information.  
Oddballs can both distract attention from the passage of time (from the accumulation of 
subjective temporal units such as seconds) and focus attention on the oddballs, themselves, 
thereby increasing the rate at which the nontemporal properties of the oddballs are processed and 
the increasing the amount of perceived and remembered subjective nontemporal information.  
In the present research, oddballs decreased the number of subjective temporal units stored 
and counted when people were engaged in relatively temporal information processing, thereby 
shortening subjective duration. Oddballs also increased the amount of subjective nontemporal 
information perceived and remembered when people were engaged in relatively nontemporal 
information processing, thereby lengthening subjective duration. Specifically, oddballs decreased 
the number of subjective temporal units stored and counted when people were making verbal 
estimations, responses that require storing and counting seconds, and when people were 
presented with repeated chord sequences, stimuli that are processed relatively efficiently and 
leave relatively many attentional resources available to track time and count seconds. On the 
other hand, oddballs increased the amount of subjective nontemporal information stored in 
memory when people were making musical imagery reproductions, responses that encourage 
attending to and rehearsing nontemporal musical properties, and when people were presented 
with incoherent chord sequences, stimuli that violate expectations, are processed relatively 
inefficiently, and leave relatively few attentional resources available to track time. 
Our proposed distinction between subjective temporal units and subjective nontemporal 
information is in line with memory-based models of time estimation, as well as the RAM. These 
models posit that the more nontemporal information, contextual changes, or high-priority events 
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perceived and remembered during an interval, the longer the subjective duration of that interval 
should become (Block, 1990; Poynter, 1989). People infer the passage of time from nontemporal 
information when temporal accents are unavailable or when relying on memory (Boltz, 1989, 
1995), as is the case in retrospective designs (Block & Zakay, 1997; Zakay, 1993); people have 
no temporal information from which to base duration judgments when time judgments are 
requested retrospectively.  
Participants often make hundreds of prospective, not retrospective, time judgments over 
the course of timing experiments that examine the temporal oddball illusion. Nevertheless, the 
implications of memory-based models, the RAM, and the present research—that duration 
judgments about oddballs in timing studies are based on subjective nontemporal information, 
rather than subjective temporal units—are compatible with the temporal expansion hypothesis.  
Although oddballs in timing experiments investigating the temporal oddball illusion are 
not judged retrospectively, they are judged as single events, and these events have relatively 
short durations. These experiments require that people judge the durations of individual oddball 
events. Oddballs that are found to be judged as reliably longer than standards are usually in the 
range of the perceptual present, or no longer than 5 s. In fact, most conditions in each 
experiment, as well as most experiments, use oddballs and standards that are shorter than 1 s. 
Explicit counting serves as a useful time estimation strategy only for intervals that are longer 
than 1 s (Grondin, Meilleur-Wells, & Lachance, 1999). 
If people avoid using counting seconds as a strategy when judging the durations of 
individual subsecond events, then they would not be able to accumulate subjective temporal units 
based on seconds, and would thus have to rely on available subjective nontemporal information 
stored in memory. This interpretation is in line with temporal expansion hypothesis because the 
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temporal expansion hypothesis states that people base duration judgments about individual 
events on the amount of perceptual—and, as we suggest, nontemporal—information processed. 
Memory-based models of time estimation state that people base duration judgments about 
intervals on the amount of nontemporal information processed. The present findings show how 
both the temporal expansion hypothesis and memory-based models make similar predictions. 
Both explain the effects of oddballs in the present experiments when people were engaged in 
relatively nontemporal information processing. 
Oddball expansion or standard contraction. There is an ongoing debate in the timing 
literature between the temporal expansion hypothesis (Tse et al., 2004) and the temporal 
contraction hypothesis (Eagleman & Pariyadath, 2009; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007, 2008a, 
2008b, 2012). Tse et al. (2004) argue that oddballs, or unpredictable events, expand subjective 
duration. Pariyadath and Eagleman (2012) argue that standards, or predictable events, contract 
subjective duration. The temporal contraction hypothesis is supported by studies examining 
repetition suppression (see Henson & Rugg, 2003; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014; 
Summerfield, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, & Egner, 2008; Todorovic & de Lange, 2012). 
Repeated stimuli increase neural efficiency. Pariyadath and Eagleman argue that subjective 
duration in timing experiments is directly connected to neural activation, such that fewer neural 
firings lead to shorter subjective experiences. Standards are judged as shorter than oddballs 
because standards are more predictable, are processed more efficiently, and activate fewer neural 
firings than oddballs. 
Both the temporal expansion and contraction hypotheses predict that people will judge 
the repeated and coherent chord sequences that contain oddballs in the present experiments as 
longer than those that do not, but each make different predictions about the effects of oddballs on 
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the incoherent chord sequences. The temporal expansion hypothesis predicts that people will 
judge the incoherent chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer than those that do not. 
Oddballs expand subjective duration, hence the inclusion of oddballs in intervals should expand 
the subjective duration of those intervals. Oddballs increase the number of subjective units stored 
and counted, hence intervals that include oddballs should have more units stored and counted 
than intervals that do not.  
On the other hand, the temporal contraction hypothesis predicts that people will judge the 
incoherent chord sequences that contain oddballs as no differently than those that do not. This is 
because the incoherent chord sequences used in the current experiments are unpredictable—
analogous to the unpredictable scrambled number sequences used in Pariyadath & Eagleman 
(2007; e.g., 1—4—3—5—2). Pariyadath and Eagleman (2012) assert that neural responses are 
not suppressed in response to unpredictable, scrambled sequences, as they are in response to 
predictable, ordinal sequences—only predictable sequences contract subjective duration. There 
were no predictable sequences in either the incoherent chord sequences that contain oddballs or 
those that do not. Therefore, the temporal contraction hypothesis predicts that we will find no 
difference between the subjective duration of the incoherent chord sequences that contain 
oddballs and those that do not.  
We found that incoherent chord sequences that contained oddballs were judged as longer 
than those that did not in both experiments. If both the subjective duration of oddballs as 
individual events and the subjective duration of oddballs that fill intervals operate under the same 
mechanisms when people are engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing, then the 
present research lends evidence to support the temporal expansion hypothesis over the temporal 




We used a novel and covert measure of subjective duration—musical imagery 
reproduction—to facilitate nontemporal information processing in two experiments. We found 
consistent evidence in support of the RAM. The effects of attention-capturing, high-priority 
events on the subjective duration of intervals in the present research depended on the degree to 
which people were engaged in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing. 
Oddballs shortened the subjective duration of chord sequences when people were engaged in 
relatively temporal information processing, but lengthened the subjective duration of chord 
sequences when people were engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing. These 
results are in line with the proposition made by dynamic attending theory and the RAM that 
temporal and nontemporal information processing are interdependent.  
In addition, we proposed that the temporal expansion hypothesis accurately accounts for 
subjective duration when people are engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing, 
and that oddballs are judged as longer than standards because oddballs increase the accumulation 
of subjective nontemporal information, rather than "subjective temporal units." In line with this 
proposal, the effects of oddballs on the subjective duration of the incoherent sequences in the 
present experiments suggest that oddballs are judged as longer than standards because oddballs 






Allen, G. D. (1972). The location of rhythmic stress beats in English: An experimental study I. 
Language and Speech, 15, 72-100. doi:10.1177/002383097201500110 
 
Avant, L. L., & Lyman, P. J. (1975). Stimulus familiarity influences perceived duration in 
prerecognition visual processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 1, 205. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.1.3.205 
 
Avant, L. L., Lyman, P. J., & Antes, J. R. (1975). Effects of stimulus familiarity upon judged 
visual duration. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 17, 253-262. 
doi:10.3758/BF03203208 
 
Baayen, R. H. (2008). Analyzing linguistic data: A practical introduction to statistics using R. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bailey, N., & Areni, C. S. (2006). When a few minutes sound like a lifetime: Does atmospheric 
music expand or contract perceived time?. Journal of Retailing, 82, 189-202. 
doi:10.1016/j.jretai.2006.05.003 
 
Barnes, R., & Jones, M. R. (2000). Expectancy, attention, and time. Cognitive Psychology, 41, 
254-311. doi:10.1006/cogp.2000.0738 
 
Barr, D. J. (2013). Random effects structure for testing interactions in linear mixed-effects 
models. Frontiers in psychology, 4. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00328 
 
Barr, D. J., Levy, R., Scheepers, C., & Tily, H. J. (2013). Random effects structure for 
confirmatory hypothesis testing: Keep it maximal. Journal of Memory and Language, 68, 
255-278. doi:10.1016/j.jml.2012.11.001 
 
Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., Walker, S. (2015). Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects Models 
Using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, 67, 1-48. doi:10.18637/jss.v067.i01 
 
Berlyne, D. E. (1966). Effects of spatial order and inter-item interval on recall of temporal order. 
Psychonomic Science, 6, 375-376. doi:10.3758/BF03330944 
 
Bertotti, B., & Easthope, P. (1978). The equivalence principle according to Mach. International 
Journal of Theoretical Physics, 17, 309-318. doi:10.1007/BF00674102 
 
Bharucha, J. J. (1987). Music cognition and perceptual facilitation: A connectionist framework. 
Music Perception, 5, 1-30. doi:10.2307/40285384 
 
Bharucha, J. J. (1994). Tonality and expectation. In Aiello, R., Sloboda, J. A. (Eds.), Musical 




Bigand, E., Madurell, F., Tillmann, B., & Pineau, M. (1999). Effect of global structure and 
temporal organization on chord processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 25, 184. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.25.1.184 
 
Bigand, E., & Parncutt, R. (1999). Perceiving musical tension in long chord sequences. 
Psychological Research, 62, 237-254. doi:10.1007/s004260050053 
 
Bigand, E., Poulin, B., Tillmann, B., Madurell, F., & D'Adamo, D. A. (2003). Sensory versus 
cognitive components in harmonic priming. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 29, 159. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.29.1.159 
 
Birngruber, T., Schröter, H., & Ulrich, R. (2014a). Duration perception of visual and auditory 
oddball stimuli: Does judgment task modulate the temporal oddball illusion?. Attention, 
Perception, & Psychophysics, 76, 814-828. doi:10.3758/s13414-013-0602-2 
 
Birngruber, T., Schröter, H., & Ulrich, R. (2014b). What makes an oddball odd? Evidence from a 
spatially predictable temporal oddball paradigm. Procedia-Social and Behavioral 
Sciences, 126, 190-191. doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.02.365 
 
Birngruber, T., Schröter, H., & Ulrich, R. (2015a). Introducing a control condition in the classic 
oddball paradigm: Oddballs are overestimated in duration not only because of their 
oddness. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 77, 1737-1749. doi:10.3758/s13414-
015-0868-7 
 
Birngruber, T., Schröter, H., & Ulrich, R. (2015b). The influence of stimulus repetition on 
duration judgments with simple stimuli. Frontiers in psychology, 6. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01213 
 
Bisson, N., Tobin, S., & Grondin, S. (2009). Remembering the duration of joyful and sad 
musical excerpts: Assessment with three estimation methods. NeuroQuantology, 7, 46-
57. doi:10.14704/nq.2009.7.1.206 
 
Block, R. A. (1974). Memory and the experience of duration in retrospect. Memory & Cognition, 
2, 153-160. doi:10.3758/BF03197508 
 
Block, R. A. (1978). Remembered duration: Effects of event and sequence complexity. Memory 
& Cognition, 6, 320-326. doi:10.3758/BF03197462 
 
Block, R. A. (1982). Temporal judgments and contextual change. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 8, 530. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.8.6.530 
 
Block, R. A. (1989). Experiencing and remembering time: Affordances, context, and cognition. 
In Levin, I., & Zakay, D. (Eds.), Time and human cognition: A life-span perspective (pp. 





Block, R.A. (1990). Models of psychological time. In Block, R.A. (Ed.), Cognitive models of 
psychological time (pp. 1-35). New York, NY: Psychology Press.  
 
Block, R. A. (1992). Prospective and retrospective duration judgment: The role of information 
processing and memory. In Macar, F., Pouthas, V., & Friedman, W. J. (Eds.), Time, 
action and cognition: Towards bridging the gap (pp. 141- 153). Dordrecht, the 
Netherlands: Kluwer. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-3536-0_16 
 
Block, R. A., George, E. J., & Reed, M. A. (1980). A watched pot sometimes boils: A study of 
duration experience. Acta Psychologica, 46, 81-94. doi:10.1016/0001-6918(80)90001-3 
 
Block, R. A., Hancock, P. A., & Zakay, D. (2010). How cognitive load affects duration 
judgments: A meta-analytic review. Acta Psychologica, 134, 330-343. 
doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2010.03.006 
 
Block, R. A., & Reed, M. A. (1978). Remembered duration: Evidence for a contextual-change 
hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 4, 656. 
doi:10.1037/0278-7393.4.6.656 
 
Block, R. A., & Zakay, D. (1997). Prospective and retrospective duration judgments: A meta-
analytic review. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 4, 184-197. doi:10.3758/BF03209393 
 
Boltz, M. G. (1989). Time judgments of musical endings: Effects of expectancies on the “filled 
interval effect”. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 46, 409-418. 
doi:10.3758/BF03210855 
 
Boltz, M. G. (1991). Time estimation and attentional perspective. Attention, Perception, & 
Psychophysics, 49, 422-433. doi:10.3758/BF03212176 
 
Boltz, M. G. (1992a). The incidental learning and remembering of event durations. In Macar, F., 
Pouthas, V., & Friedman, W. J. (Eds.), Time, action and cognition: Towards bridging the 
gap (pp. 153-163). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-3536-
0_17 
 
Boltz, M. G. (1992b). The remembering of auditory event durations. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18, 938-956. doi:10.1037/0278-
7393.18.5.938 
 
Boltz, M. G. (1993). Time estimation and expectancies. Memory & Cognition, 21, 853-863. 
doi:10.3758/BF03202753 
 
Boltz, M. G. (1994). Changes in internal tempo and effects on the learning and remembering of 
event durations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 




Boltz, M. G. (1995). Effects of event structure on retrospective duration judgments. Attention, 
Perception, & psychophysics, 57, 1080-1096. doi:10.3758/BF03205466 
 
Boltz, M. G. (1998). The processing of temporal and nontemporal information in the 
remembering of event durations and musical structure. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 24, 1087. doi:10.1037/0096-
1523.24.4.1087 
 
Boltz, M. G. (1999). The processing of melodic and temporal information: Independent or 
unified dimensions?. Journal of New Music Research, 28, 67-79. 
doi:10.1076/jnmr.28.1.67.3121 
 
Boltz, M. G., & Jones, M. R. (1986). Does rule recursion make melodies easier to reproduce? If 
not, what does?. Cognitive psychology, 18, 389-431. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(86)90005-8 
 
Brown, S. W. (1985). Time perception and attention: The effects of prospective versus 
retrospective paradigms and task demands on perceived duration. Attention, Perception, 
& Psychophysics, 38, 115-124. doi:10.3758/BF03198848 
 
Brown, S. W. (1995). Time, change, and motion: The effects of stimulus movement on temporal 
perception. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 57, 105-116.  
 
Brown, S. W. (1997). Attentional resources in timing: Interference effects in concurrent temporal 
and nontemporal working memory tasks. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 59, 
1118–1140. doi:10.3758/ BF03205526 
 
Brown, S. W. (2008). Time and attention: Review of the literature. In Grondin, S. (Ed.), 
Psychology of time (pp. 111-138). Bingley, U.K.: Emerald Group. 
 
Brown, S. W., & Boltz, M. G. (2002). Attentional processes in time perception: Effects of mental 
workload and event structure. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 28, 600. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.28.3.600 
 
Brown, S. W., & Stubbs, D. A. (1988). The psychophysics of retrospective and prospective 
timing. Perception, 17, 297-310. doi: 10.1068/p170297 
 
Bueno, J. L. O., Firmino, E. A., & Engelmann, A. (2002). Influence of generalized complexity of 
a musical event on subjective time estimation. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 94, 541-547. 
doi: 10.2466/pms.2002.94.2.541 
 
Bueno, J. L. O., & Ramos, D. (2007). Musical mode and estimation of time. Perceptual and 
Motor Skills, 105, 1087-1092. doi: 10.2466/pms.105.4.1087-1092 
 
Bybee, J. (2002). Sequentiality as the basis of constituent structure. In Givón, T., & Malle, B. F. 
(Eds.), The evolution of language out of pre-language (pp. 109–134). Amsterdam, the 




Caetano, M., Mouchtaris, A., & Wiering, F. (2012). The role of time in music emotion 
recognition: Modeling musical emotions from time-varying music features. In Aramaki, 
M., Barthet, M., Kronland-Martinet, R., Ystad, S. (Eds.), From Sounds to Music and 
Emotions (pp. 171-196). London, England: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-41248-6_10 
 
Cai, M. B., Eagleman, D. M., & Ma, W. J. (2015). Perceived duration is reduced by repetition 
but not by high-level expectation. Journal of Vision, 15(13), 1-17. doi:10.1167/15.13.19  
 
Chebat, J. C., Gelinas-Chebat, C., & Filiatrault, P. (1993). Interactive effects of musical and 
visual cues on time perception: An application to waiting lines in banks. Perceptual and 
Motor Skills, 77, 995-1020. doi:10.2466/pms.1993.77.3.995 
 
Clarke, E. F. (1999). Rhythm and timing in music. In Deutsch, D. (Ed.), The Psychology of 
Music, (pp. 473–500). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
 
Coull, J. T., & Nobre, A. C. (2008). Dissociating explicit timing from temporal expectation with 
fMRI. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 18, 137-144. 
doi:doi:10.1016/j.conb.2008.07.011 
 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience. New York, NY: 
Harper and Row.  
 
Debener, S., Kranczioch, C., Herrmann, C. S., & Engel, A. K. (2002). Auditory novelty oddball 
allows reliable distinction of top–down and bottom–up processes of attention. 
International Journal of Psychophysiology, 46, 77-84. doi:10.1016/S0167-
8760(02)00072-7 
 
Dehaene, S., Naccache, L., Cohen, L., Le Bihan, D., Mangin, J. F., Poline, J. B., & Rivière, D. 
(2001). Cerebral mechanisms of word masking and unconscious repetition priming. 
Nature Neuroscience, 4, 752-758. doi:10.1038/89551 
 
Deutsch, D. (1970). Tones and numbers: Specificity of interference in immediate memory. 
Science, 168, 1604-1605. doi:10.1126/science.168.3939.1604 
 
Deutsch, D. (1972). Mapping of interactions in the pitch memory store. Science, 175, 1020-1022. 
doi:10.1126/science.175.4025.1020 
 
Donnadieu, S. (2007). Mental representation of the timbre of complex sounds. In Beauchamp, 
J.W. (Ed.), Analysis, synthesis, and perception of musical sounds: The sound of music 
(pp. 272-319). New York, NY: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-0-387-32576-7_8 
 
Droit-Volet, S., Bigand, E., Ramos, D., & Bueno, J. L. O. (2010). Time flies with music 





Dyer, F. N. (1973). The Stroop phenomenon and its use in the study of perceptual, cognitive, and 
response processes. Memory & Cognition, 1, 106-120. doi:10.3758/BF03198078 
 
Eagleman, D. M., & Pariyadath, V. (2009). Is Subjective Duration a Signature of Coding 
Efficiency?. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological 
Sciences, 364, 1841-1851. doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0026 
 
Field, D. T., & Groeger, J. A. (2004). Temporal interval production and short-term memory. 
Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 66, 808-819. doi:10.3758/BF03194975 
 
Finch, W. H., Bolin, J. E., Kelley, K. (2014). Multilevel Modeling Using R. Boca Raton, FL: 
CRC Press.  
 
Firmino, E. A., & Bueno, J. L. O. (2008). Tonal modulation and subjective time. Journal of New 
Music Research, 37, 275-297. doi: 10.1080/09298210802711652 
 
Firmino, E. A., & Bueno, J. L. O. (2013, October). Musical tonal modulation between minor 
keys and subjective time. Paper presented at Fechner Day 2013 – the 29th Annual 
Meeting of the International Society for Psychophysics, Freiburg, Germany. Retrieved 
from http://fechnerday.com/fd2013/pdfs/fd2013-proc-book-c.pdf 
 
Firmino, E. A., & Bueno, J. L. O. (2014, August). Distances between modulating keys also 
shorten subjective time estimations in real music stimuli. Paper presented at Fechner Day 
2014 – the 30th Annual Meeting of the International Society for Psychophysics, Lund, 




Firmino, É. A., Bueno, J. L. O., & Bigand, E. (2009). Travelling through pitch space speeds up 
musical time. Music Perception, 26, 205-209. doi:10.1525/mp.2009.26.3.205 
 
Fox, J., & Weisberg, S. (2010). An R companion to applied regression. London, England: Sage. 
 
Fraisse, P. (1956). Les structures rhythmiques. Louvain, Belgium: Editions Universitaires.  
 
Fraisse, P. (1963). The psychology of time. New York, NY: Harper & Row. 
 
Fraisse, P. (1984). Perception and estimation of time. Annual Review of Psychology, 35, 1-36. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.35.020184.000245 
 
Friedman, W. J. (1993). Memory for the time of past events. Psychological Bulletin, 113, 44-66. 
doi:10.1037/0033-2909.113.1.44 
 
Gaudreault, R., & Fortin, C. (2013). To count or not to count: The effect of instructions on 





Gopher, D., Armony, L., & Greenshpan, Y. (2000). Switching tasks and attention policies. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129, 308-339. doi:10.1037/0096-
3445.129.3.308 
 
Goydke, K. N., Altenmüller, E., Möller, J., & Münte, T. F. (2004). Changes in emotional tone 
and instrumental timbre are reflected by the mismatch negativity. Cognitive Brain 
Research, 21, 351-359. doi:10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2004.06.009 
 
Grill-Spector, K., Henson, R., & Martin, A. (2006). Repetition and the brain: Neural models of 
stimulus-specific effects. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 14-23. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.11.006 
 
Grondin, S. (2010). Timing and time perception: A review of recent behavioral and neuroscience 
findings and theoretical directions. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 72, 561-582. 
doi:10.3758/APP.72.3.561 
 
Grondin, S., Bisson, N., & Gagnon, C. (2011). Sensitivity to time interval changes in speech and 
tone conditions. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 73, 720-728. 
doi:10.3758/s13414-010-0063-9 
 
Grondin, S., & Killeen, P. R. (2009). Tracking time with song and count: Different Weber 
functions for musicians and nonmusicians. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 71, 
1649-1654. doi:10.3758/APP.71.7.1649 
 
Grondin, S., & Laflamme, V. (2015). Stevens’s law for time: A direct comparison of prospective 
and retrospective judgments. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 77, 1044-1051. 
doi:10.3758/s13414-015-0914-5 
 
Grondin, S., & McAuley, J. D. (2009). Duration discrimination in crossmodal sequences. 
Perception, 38, 1542-1559. doi: 10.1068/p6359 
 
Grondin, S., Meilleur-Wells, G., & Lachance, R. (1999). When to start explicit counting in a 
time-intervals discrimination task: A critical point in the timing process of humans. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 25, 993-
1004. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.25.4.99 
 
Grosjean, F. (1980). Spoken word recognition processes and the gating paradigm. Attention, 
Perception, & Psychophysics, 28, 267-283. doi:10.3758/BF03204386 
 
Halpern, A. R. (1988a). Mental scanning in auditory imagery for songs. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 14, 434. doi:10.1037/0278-
7393.14.3.434 
 





Halpern, A. R., & Zatorre, R. J. (1999). When that tune runs through your head: A PET 
investigation of auditory imagery for familiar melodies. Cerebral Cortex, 9, 697-704. 
doi:10.1093/cercor/9.7.697  
 
Henson, R. N. A., & Rugg, M. D. (2003). Neural response suppression, haemodynamic 
repetition effects, and behavioural priming. Neuropsychologia, 41, 263-270. 
doi:10.1016/S0028-3932(02)00159-8 
 
Hicks, R. E., Miller, G. W., & Kinsbourne, M. (1976). Prospective and retrospective judgments 
of time as a function of amount of information processed. The American Journal of 
Psychology, 89, 719-730. doi:10.2307/1421469 
 
Hon, N., & Tan, C. H. (2013). Why rare targets are slow: Evidence that the target probability 
effect has an attentional locus. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 75, 388-393. 
doi:10.3758/s13414-013-0434-0 
 
Hornstein, A. D., & Rotter, G. S. (1969). Research methodology in temporal perception. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 79, 561. doi:10.1037/h0026870 
 
Huettel, S. A., Mack, P. B., & McCarthy, G. (2002). Perceiving patterns in random series: 
Dynamic processing of sequence in prefrontal cortex. Nature Neuroscience, 5, 485-490. 
doi:10.1038/nn841 
 
Huron, D. B. (2006). Sweet anticipation: Music and the psychology of expectation. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT press. 
 
Huron, D. B., & Margulis, E. H. (2010). Musical expectancy and thrills. In Juslin, P. N, & 
Sloboda, J. A. (Eds.), Handbook of music and emotion: Theory, research, applications 
(pp. 575-604). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230143.003.0021 
 
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York, NY: Holt.  
 
Janata, P., & Paroo, K. (2006). Acuity of auditory images in pitch and time. Attention, 
Perception, & Psychophysics, 68, 829-844. doi:10.3758/BF03193705 
 
Jarvis, B. G. (2014). DirectRT (Version 2014). New York, NY: Empirisoft Corporation.  
 
Jones, M. R. (1990). Musical events and models of time estimation. In Block, R.A. (Ed.), 
Cognitive models of psychological time (pp. 207-240). New York, NY: Psychology Press.  
 
Jones, M. R., & Boltz, M. (1989). Dynamic attending and responses to time. Psychological 




Jones, M. R., Boltz, M., & Kidd, G. (1982). Controlled attending to as a function of melodic and 
temporal context. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 32, 211-218. doi: 
10.3758/BF03206225 
 
Juslin, P. N., & Västfjäll, D. (2008). Emotional responses to music: The need to consider 
underlying mechanisms. Behavioral and brain sciences, 31, 559-575. 
doi:10.1017/S0140525X08005293. 
 
Justus, T. C., & Bharucha, J. J. (2001). Modularity in musical processing: The automaticity of 
harmonic priming. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 27, 1000. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.27.4.1000 
 
Kahneman, D. (1973). Attention and effort. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Kellaris, J. J., & Kent, R. J. (1992). The influence of music on consumers' temporal perceptions: 
Does time fly when you're having fun?. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 1, 365-376. 
doi:10.1016/S1057-7408(08)80060-5 
 
Kim, E., & McAuley, J. D. (2013). Effects of pitch distance and likelihood on the perceived 
duration of deviant auditory events. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 75, 1547-
1558. doi:10.3758/s13414-013-0490-5 
 
Klink, P. C., Montijn, J. S., & van Wezel, R. J. (2011). Crossmodal duration perception involves 
perceptual grouping, temporal ventriloquism, and variable internal clock rates. Attention, 
Perception, & Psychophysics, 73, 219-236. doi:10.3758/s13414-010-0010-9 
 
Kosslyn, S. M. (1981). The medium and the message in mental imagery: A theory. 
Psychological Review, 88, 46-66. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.88.1.46 
 
Kosslyn, S. M., Ball, T. M., & Reiser, B. J. (1978). Visual images preserve metric spatial 
information: Evidence from studies of image scanning. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 4, 47. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.4.1.47 
 
Koutstaal, W., Wagner, A. D., Rotte, M., Maril, A., Buckner, R. L., & Schacter, D. L. (2001). 
Perceptual specificity in visual object priming: Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
evidence for a laterality difference in fusiform cortex. Neuropsychologia, 39, 184-199. 
doi:10.1016/S0028-3932(00)00087-7 
 
Kowal, K. H. (1987). Apparent duration and numerosity as a function of melodic familiarity. 
Attention, Perceptio,n & Psychophysics, 42, 122−131. doi:10.3758/BF03210500 
 
Kristjánsson, Á., & Campana, G. (2010). Where perception meets memory: A review of 





Kruijne, W., & Meeter, M. (2015). The long and the short of priming in visual search. Attention, 
Perception, & Psychophysics, 77, 1558-1573. doi:10.3758/s13414-015-0860-2 
 
Lebrun-Guillaud, G. R., & Tillmann, B. (2007). Influence of a tone’s tonal function on temporal 
change detection. Attention, Perception, & psychophysics, 69, 1450-1459. 
doi:10.3758/BF03192959 
 
Lebrun-Guillaud, G. R., Tillmann, B., & Justus T. (2008). Perception of tonal and temporal 
structures in chord sequences by patients with cerebellar damage. Music Perception, 25, 
271-283. doi: 10.1525/mp.2008.25.4.271 
 
Lecanuet, J. P. (1996). Prenatal auditory experience. In Deliege, I., Sloboda, J. A. (Eds.), 
Musical beginnings: Origins and development of musical competence (pp. 3–34). Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198523321.003.0001 
 
Lejeune, H., & Wearden, J. H. (2009). Vierordt’s The experimental study of the time sense 
(1868) and its legacy. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 21, 941-960. 
doi:10.1080/09541440802453006 
 
Lerdahl, F., & Jackendoff, R. (1983). A generative theory of tonal music. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
 
Levitin, D. J., & Cook, P. R. (1996). Memory for musical tempo: Additional evidence that 
auditory memory is absolute. Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 58, 927-935. 
doi:10.3758/BF03205494 
 
Logan, G. D. (1980). Attention and automaticity in Stroop and priming nontemporal tasks: 
Theory and data. Cognitive Psychology, 12, 523-553. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(80)90019-5 
 
Logan, G. D., & Zbrodoff, N. J. (1979). When it helps to be misled: Facilitative effects of 
increasing the frequency of conflicting stimuli in a Stroop-like nontemporal task. Memory 
& Cognition, 7, 166-174. doi:10.3758/BF0319753 
 
Maess, B., Koelsch, S., Gunter, T. C., & Friederici, A. D. (2001). Musical syntax is processed in 
Broca's area: An MEG study. Nature Neuroscience, 4, 540-545. doi:10.1038/87502  
 
Maljkovic, V., & Nakayama, K. (1994). Priming of pop-out: I. Role of features. Memory & 
Cognition, 22, 657-672. doi:10.3758/BF03209251 
 
Margulis, E. H. (2005). A Model of Melodic Expectation. Music Perception, 22, 663-
714. doi:10.1525/mp.2005.22.4.663 
 
Margulis, E. H. (2007). Surprise and listening ahead: Analytic engagements with musical 




Margulis, E. H. (2014). On repeat: How music plays the mind. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Margulis, E. H., & Simchy-Gross, R. (2016). Repetition enhances the musicality of randomly 
generated tone sequences. Music Perception, 33, 509-514. doi:10.1525/mp.2016.33.4.509 
 
Matthews, W. J. (2015). Time perception: The surprising effects of surprising stimuli. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 144, 172. doi:10.1037/xge0000041 
 
Matthews, W. J., & Gheorghiu, A. I. (2016). Repetition, expectation, and the perception of 
time. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 8, 110-116. 
doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2016.02.019 
 
McClain, L. (1983). Interval estimation: Effect of processing demands on prospective and 
retrospective reports. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 34, 185-189. 
doi:10.3758/BF03211347 
 
McKay, T. D. (1977). Time estimation: Effects of attentional focus and a comparison of interval 
conditions. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 45, 584-586. doi:10.2466/pms.1977.45.2.584 
 
McPeek, R. M., Maljkovic, V., & Nakayama, K. (1999). Saccades require focal attention and are 
facilitated by a short-term memory system. Vision research, 39, 1555-1566. 
doi:10.1016/S0042-6989(98)00228-4 
 
Meyer, L. B. (1956). Emotion and meaning in music. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Miller, D. T. (1978). Locus of control and the ability to tolerate gratification delay: When it is 
better to be an external. Journal of Research in Personality, 12, 49-56. doi:10.1016/0092-
6566(78)90082-X 
 
Miller, G. W., Hicks, R. E., & Willette, M. (1978). Effects of concurrent verbal rehearsal and 
temporal set upon judgements of temporal duration. Acta Psychologica, 42, 173-179. 
doi:10.1016/0001-6918(78)90026-4 
 
Mioni, G., Stablum, F., McClintock, S. M., & Grondin, S. (2014). Different methods for 
reproducing time, different results. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 76, 675-681. 
doi:10.3758/s13414-014-0625-3 
 
Morey, R. (2008). Confidence intervals from normalized data: A correction to Cousineau (2005). 
Tutorial in Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 4, 61–64.  
 
Ornstein, R. E. (1969). On the experience of time. New York: Penguin. 
 
Ortega, L., Guzman-Martinez, E., Grabowecky, M., & Suzuki, S. (2014). Audition dominates 
vision in duration perception irrespective of salience, attention, and temporal 
77 
 
discriminability. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 76, 1485-1502. 
doi:10.3758/s13414-014-0663-x 
 
Pariyadath, V., & Eagleman, D. M. (2007). The effect of predictability on subjective 
duration. PloS ONE, 2(11), e1264. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001264 
 
Pariyadath, V., & Eagleman, D. M. (2008a). Brief subjective durations contract with 
repetition. Journal of Vision, 8(11), 1-6. doi:10.1167/8.16.11 
 
Pariyadath, V., & Eagleman, D. M. (2008b). Duration Illusions and What They Tell Us about the 
Brain. Advances in Cognitive Science, 2, 196. 
 
Pariyadath, V., & Eagleman, D. M. (2012). Subjective duration distortions mirror neural 
repetition suppression. PLoS ONE, 7(12), e49362. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049362 
 
Patel, A. D. (2003). Language, music, syntax and the brain. Nature Neuroscience, 6, 674-681. 
doi: doi:10.1038/nn1082 
 
Patel, A. D. (2007). Music, language, and the brain. New York, NY: Oxford university press. 
 
Penhune, V. B., Zatorre, R. J., & Evans, A. (1998). Cerebellar contributions to motor timing: A 
PET study of auditory and visual rhythm reproduction. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 10, 752-765. doi:10.1162/089892998563149 
 
Phillips, M. (2015). Towards a combined theory of psychological time during music listening 
and dynamic attending theory. Paper presented at the Ninth Triennial Conference of the 





Phillips, M., & Cross, I. (2011). About musical time–Effect of age, enjoyment, and practical 
musical experience on retrospective estimate of elapsed duration during music listening. 
In Vatakis, A., Esposito, A., Giagkou, M., Cummins, F., & Papadelis, G. (Eds.), 
Multidisciplinary aspects of time and time perception (pp. 125-136). Heidelberg, 
Germany: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-21478-3_11 
 
Ponsot, E., Susini, P., & Meunier, S. (2015). A robust asymmetry in loudness between rising-and 
falling- intensity tones. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 77, 907-920. 
doi:10.3758/s13414-014-0824-y 
 
Povel, D.-J. (1981). Internal representation of simple temporal patterns. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 7, 3-18. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.7.1.3 
 
Poynter, W. D. (1983). Duration judgment and the segmentation of experience. Memory & 




Poynter, W. D. (1989). Judging the duration of time intervals: A process of remembering 
segments of experience. In Levin, I., & Zakay, D. (Eds.), Time and human cognition: A 
life-span perspective (pp. 305-331). Amsterdam, the Netherlands: North-Holland. 
doi:10.1016/S0166-4115(08)61045-6 
 
Poynter, W. D., & Homa, D. (1983). Duration judgment and the experience of change. Attention, 
Perception, & Psychophysics, 33, 548-560. doi:10.3758/BF03202936 
 
Proctor, R. W., Lu, C. H., Van Zandt, T., & Weeks, D. J. (1994). Affordances, codes, and 
decision processes: A response to Michaels (1993). Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 20, 452-455. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.20.2.452 
 
Quené, H., & Van den Bergh, H. (2004). On multi- level modeling of data from repeated 
measures designs: A tutorial. Speech Communication, 43, 103-121. 
doi:10.1016/j.specom.2004.02.004 
 
R Core Team (2013). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for 
Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. Retrieved from http://www.R-project.org/ 
 
Rao, S. M., Mayer, A. R., & Harrington, D. L. (2001). The evolution of brain activation during 
temporal processing. Nature Neuroscience, 4, 317-323. doi:10.1038/85191 
 
Rattat, A. C., & Droit-Volet, S. (2010). The effects of interference and retention delay on 
temporal generalization performance. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 72, 1903-
1912. doi:10.3758/APP.72.7.1903 
 
Regnault, P., Bigand, E., & Besson, M. (2001). Different brain mechanisms mediate sensitivity 
to sensory consonance and harmonic context: Evidence from auditory event-related brain 
potentials. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 13, 241-255. 
doi:10.1162/089892901564298 
 
Rosen, S. (1992). Temporal information in speech: Acoustic, auditory and linguistic aspects. 
Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, 336, 367-373. 
doi:10.1098/rstb.1992.0070 
 
Rosner, B. (1983). Percentage points for a generalized ESD many-outlier 
procedure. Technometrics, 25, 165-172. doi:10.1080/00401706.1983.1048784 
 
Saffran, J. R., Aslin, R. N., & Newport, E. L. (1996). Statistical learning by 8-month-old infants. 
Science, 274, 1926-1928. doi:10.1126/science.274.5294.1926 
 
Sasaki, T., Nakajima, Y., Ten Hoopen, G., Van Buuringen, E., Massier, B., Kojo, T., . . . & 
Ueda, K. (2010). Time stretching: Illusory lengthening of filled auditory durations. 




Schäfer, T., Fachner, J., & Smukalla, M. (2013). Changes in the representation of space and time 
while listening to music. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 1-15. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00508 
 
Schiffman, H. R., & Bobko, D. J. (1977). The role of number and familiarity of stimuli in the 
perception of brief temporal intervals. The American Journal of Psychology, 90, 85-93. 
doi:10.2307/1421643 
 
Schindel, R., Rowlands, J., & Arnold, D. H. (2011). The oddball effect: Perceived duration and 
predictive coding. Journal of Vision, 11(2), 1-9. doi:10.1167/11.2.17 
 
Schmuckler, M. A., & Boltz, M. G. (1994). Harmonic and rhythmic influences on musical 
expectancy. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 56, 313-325. 
doi:10.3758/BF03209765 
 
Seifried, T., & Ulrich, R. (2011). Exogenous visual attention prolongs perceived duration. 
Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 73, 68-85. doi:10.3758/s13414-010-0005-6 
 
Shams, L., & Kim, R. (2010). Crossmodal influences on visual perception. Physics of Life 
Reviews, 7, 269-284. doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2010.04.006 
 
Shallice, T. (1994). Multiple levels of control processes. In Umiltà, C., & Moscovitch, M. (Eds.), 
Attention and performance XV: Conscious and nonconscious information processing. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Simchy-Gross, R., & Margulis, E.H. (2014, November). Attention, density, and coherence in 
musical time estimation. Paper presented at the Auditory Perception Cognition and 
Action Meeting (APCAM), Long Beach, CA. Abstract retrieved from 
http://apcam.us/APCAM2014Program.pdf 
 
Simchy-Gross, R., & Margulis, E.H. (2015, August). Attention, density, and coherence in 
musical time estimation. Paper presented at the Ninth Triennial Conference of the 





Snijders, T., & Bosker, R. (1999). Multilevel analysis: An introduction to basic and advanced 
multilevel modeling. London, England: Sage. 
 
Sokolov, E. N. (1963). Perception and the conditioned reflex. New York, NY: McMillan. 
 
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of Experimental 




Summerfield, C., & de Lange, F. P. (2014). Expectation in perceptual decision making: neural 
and computational mechanisms. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 15, 745–756. 
doi:10.1038/nrn3838 
 
Summerfield, C., Trittschuh, E. H., Monti, J. M., Mesulam, M. M., & Egner, T. (2008). Neural 
repetition suppression reflects fulfilled perceptual expectations. Nature Neuroscience, 11, 
1004-1006. doi:10.1038/nn.216 
 
Thomas, E. C., & Brown, I. (1974). Time perception and the filled-duration illusion. Attention, 
Perception, & Psychophysics, 16, 449-458. doi:10.3758/BF03198571 
 
Thomas, E. A., & Weaver, W. B. (1975). Cognitive processing and time perception. Attention, 
Perception, & Psychophysics, 17, 363-367. doi:10.3758/BF03199347 
 
Thomaschke, R., Kiesel, A., & Hoffmann, J. (2011). Response specific temporal expectancy: 
Evidence from a variable foreperiod paradigm. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 
73, 2309-2322. doi: 10.3758/s13414-011-0179-6 
 
Tillmann, B., & Bigand, E. (2001). Global context effect in normal and scrambled musical 
sequences. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 
27, 1185. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.27.5.1185 
 
Tillmann, B., Bigand, E., & Pineau, M. (1998). Effects of global and local contexts on harmonic 
expectancy. Music Perception, 16, 99-117. doi:10.2307/40285780 
 
Tillmann, B., & Lebrun-Guillaud, G. (2006). Influence of tonal and temporal expectations on 
chord processing and on completion judgments of chord sequences. Psychological 
Research, 70, 345-358. doi:10.1007/s00426-005-0222-0 
 
Todorovic, A. & de Lange, F. P. (2012). Repetition suppression and expectation suppression are 
dissociable in time in early auditory evoked fields. The Journal of Neuroscience, 32, 
13389–13395. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2227-12.2012 
 
Treisman, M. (1963). Temporal discrimination and the indifference interval: Implications for a 
model of the" internal clock". Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 77, 1. 
doi:10.1037/h0093864 
 
Tse, P. U., Intriligator, J., Rivest, J., & Cavanagh, P. (2004). Attention and the subjective 
expansion of time. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 66, 1171-1189. 
doi:10.3758/BF03196844 
 
Turvey, M. (1977) Preliminaries to a theory of action with reference to vision. In Shaw, R., & 
Bransford, J. (Eds.), Perceiving, acting, and knowing: Toward an ecological physiology 




van Rijn, H. (2016). Accounting for memory mechanisms in interval timing: a review. Current 
Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 8, 245-249. doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2016.02.01 
 
Warm, J. S., Smith, R. P., & Caldwell, L. S. (1967). Effects of induced muscle tension on 
judgment of time. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 25, 153-160. 
doi:10.2466/pms.1967.25.1.153 
 
Weber, R. J., & Brown, S. (1986). Musical imagery. Music Perception, 3, 411-426. 
doi:10.2307/40285346 
 
Wittmann, M., & Paulus, M. P. (2008). Decision making, impulsivity and time perception. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12, 7-12. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2007.10.004 
 
Zakay, D. (1989). Subjective time and attentional resource allocation: An integrated model of 
time estimation. In Levin, I., & Zakay, D. (Eds.), Time and human cognition: A life-span 
perspective (pp. 365-397). Amsterdam, the Netherlands: North-Holland. 
doi:10.1016/S0166-4115(08)61047- 
 
Zakay, D. (1993). Relative and absolute duration judgments under prospective and retrospective 
paradigms. Attention, Perception & psychophysics, 54, 656-664. 
doi:10.3758/BF03211789 
 
Zakay, D. (2014). Psychological time as information: The case of boredom. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 5. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00917 
 
Zakay, D., Bibi, A., & Algom, D. (2014). Garner interference and temporal information 
processing. Acta psychologica, 147, 143-146. doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2013.07.019 
 
Zakay, D., & Block, R. A. (1995). An attentional gate model of prospective time estimation. In 
Richelle, M., Keyser, V. D., d'Ydewalle, G., & Vandierendonck A. (Eds.), Time and the 
dynamic control of behavior (pp. 167-178). Liège, Belgium: Université de Liège. 
 
Zakay, D., & Block, R. A. (2004). Prospective and retrospective duration judgments: An 
executive-control perspective. Acta Neurobiologiae Experimentalis, 64, 319-328. 
 
Zakay, D., & Fallach, E. (1984). Immediate and remote time estimation—A comparison. Acta 
Psychologica, 57, 69-81. doi:10.1016/0001-6918(84)90054-4 
 
Zakay, D., Tsal, Y., Moses, M., & Shahar, I. (1994). The role of segmentation in prospective and 
retrospective time estimation processes. Memory & Cognition, 22, 344-351. 
doi:10.3758/BF03200861 
 
Zelaznik, H. N., Spencer, R., & Ivry, R. B. (2002). Dissociation of explicit and implicit timing in 
repetitive tapping and drawing movements. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 




Ziv, N., & Omer, E. (2010). Music and time: The effect of experimental paradigm, musical 















                                                 
1 This is a tenet of Vierordt’s law. Vierordt’s law states that people tend to overestimate 
relatively short intervals and underestimate relatively long intervals (see Lejeune & Wearden, 
2009; van Rijn, 2016). 
2 Instructions that do not explicitly state duration appear in the timing literature where studies 
investigate implicit timing processes. Implicit measures of subjective duration emerge from 
actions or behaviors (Turvey, 1977), such as running, speaking, and singing (Zelaznik, Spencer, 
& Ivry, 2002); there is, moreover, an important distinction between explicit and implicit timing 
processes (Coull & Nobre, 2008). 
3 It is important avoid explicitly stating duration in instructions when manipulating information 
processing in order to help prevent pre-trial awareness of duration, or temporal information 
processing. Pre-trial awareness of duration is, after all, the distinguishing characteristic between 
the two major paradigms used in time estimation experiments (prospective and retrospective), 
and an important factor in time estimation research, in general. 
4 Some short interval time estimation experiments have made musical imagery an integral part of 
their duration reproductions (see Boltz, 1995, 1998, 1999; Brown & Boltz, 2002; Firmino & 
Bueno, 2008, 2013, 2014; Firmino et al., 2009; Jones & Boltz, 1989). Nonetheless, their 
experimental instructions explicitly state duration or time.  
5 The processing of duration has much in common with the processing of other nontemporal 
information, such as the physical length of stimuli (Zakay, Bibi, & Algom, 2014).  
6 Imagination, after all, involves creating surface representations of deep structures stored in 




                                                                                                                                                             
7 Time estimation delay affects information processing because temporal information is most 
retrievable from memory and most relevant to duration judgments immediately following an 
interval. The retrievability and relevancy of temporal information degrades as the time between 
the end of an interval and the beginning of an estimation lengthens. This degradation can, of 
course, be avoided by intentionally storing temporal information in long-term memory. But 
researchers can prevent this by requiring that people perform distractor tasks during the delays 
(Zakay & Fallach, 1984). 
8 Time estimation delay refers to whether estimates are made immediately following the close of 
an interval (immediate estimation) or after a given amount of time (remote estimation). Time 
estimation reference refers to whether estimates are based on information stored in short-term 
memory (absolute estimation) or long-term memory (relative estimations).  
9 This latter finding supports attention-based models because the type of segmentation used in 
this experiment did not affect nontemporal task demands or attention to the passage of time. 
10 Task switching constitutes alternating attention between different types of task-related 
stimulus information (e.g., colors or words; Gopher, Armony, & Greenshpan, 2000), and is an 
important part of executive control (Shallice, 1994). 
11 Oddballs are low-probability events; standards are high-probability events. Examples of an 
oddball include a circle following a series of squares, or a high-pitched tone following a series of 
low-pitched tones, where the squares and low-pitched tones are standards. Low-probability, 
unexpected stimuli capture attention (Sokolov, 1963). Low-probability stimuli demand more 
attentional resources than high-probability stimuli (Hon & Tan, 2013), and more attention to 




                                                                                                                                                             
furthermore, have been shown to involuntarily capture both bottom-up and top-down attentional 
processes (Debener, Kranczioch, Herrmann, & Engel, 2002). Moreover, abrupt, novel, low- and 
high-pitched events, such as oddballs, produce automatic activation of brain stem reflexes 
(Goydke, Altenmüller, Möller, & Münte, 2004; Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008) and physiological 
processes, even in pre-birth infants (Lecanuet, 1996).  
12 Sliding tones are especially salient because they exhibit motion (Brown, 1995). 
13 We ran a pilot study to show that 12 repetitions were sufficient to make the chord sequences 
familiar. In the pilot study, participants listened carefully to 144 randomly-presented chord 
sequences in an initial exposure phase (12 unique chord sequences played 12 times each). Then 
participants made familiarity ratings for each of 24 unique chord sequences (half of which were 
presented in the exposure phase and half of which were not). The chord sequences that were 
presented in the exposure phase were rated as significantly more familiar than those that were 
not.  
14 Expectations that C Major chords will occur at regular periods in time are distinct from 
expectations about the likelihood that any given C Major chord in the sequence will be the last 
sequential event. The coherent chord sequences offered relatively high temporal predictability 
about sequence ending time because tonic chords (C Major) following dominant ones (G Major), 






































Figure 5. Mean ratio scores (±1 SEM) for the chord sequences that contained oddballs and those 










Figure 6. Mean ratio scores (±1 SEM) for the chord sequences that contained oddballs and those 
















































































































Figure 8. Mean ratio scores (±1 SEM) for the chord sequences that contained oddballs and those 













































































































Research Compliance Approval, Experiments 1 and 2
 
